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ABSTRACT 
Many of the conflicts fought in the world today are fought internally between rival 
ethnic groups.  Although the cause of the conflict may differ, the violent and often 
brutal nature of these conflicts makes them a threat that the international 
community cannot ignore.  This thesis will analyse the progress of defence 
reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina - with specific attention to the role of ethnicity 
within the armed forces. The thesis discusses the challenges and actions taken 
by the international community to establish a united, state level defence force 
under a single chain of command. The political situation in the Balkans highlights 
the fact that ethnic issues are crucial in the security of the region. The central 
argument of this thesis is that in ethnically divided countries such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, abolishing ethnically segregated defence forces in favour of one 
unified force is crucial to the creation of state viability.  The thesis hypothesises 
that ethnic segregation and lack of integration within the forces today contributes 
to ongoing instability within Bosnia.   As a serving member of the New Zealand 
Defence Force, the author participated in the post–conflict stabilisation process in 
both Bosnia and Kosovo.  Having witnessed first hand the effects of ethnicity in 
the Bosnian defence forces and the wider community, the author now seeks to 
analyse the pace of defence reform within Bosnia and Herzegovina which has 
been challenged by ethnic phenomena since the cessation of hostilities in 1995. 
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Chapter One - INTRODUCTION 
Many of the conflicts fought in the world today are fought internally between rival 
ethnic groups.  Although the cause of the conflict may differ, the violent and often 
brutal nature of these conflicts makes them a threat that the international 
community cannot ignore.  This thesis will analyse the progress of Defence 
Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina - with specific attention to the role of ethnicity 
within the armed forces. The thesis discusses the challenges faced and actions 
taken by the international community to establish a united, state level defence 
force under a single chain of command. The political situation in the Balkans 
highlights the fact that ethnic issues are crucial in the security of the region. The 
central argument of this thesis is that in ethnically divided countries such as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, abolishing ethnically segregated defence forces in 
favour of one unified force is crucial to the creation of state viability.  The thesis 
hypothesises that ethnic segregation and lack of integration within the armed 
forces today contributes to ongoing instability within Bosnia.    
Bosnia is an excellent example of the form of ethnically driven internal conflict 
that has challenged the international community since the end of the Cold War; 
the success or failure of the post-conflict nation building process in Bosnia may 
therefore serve as a first hand lesson for other post-conflict nation building efforts 
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that the international community may become involved in.  Success in Bosnia is 
also important to the international community.  The post-conflict reconciliation 
and nation building task in Bosnia was one of the first of its kind and continues to 
require close international monitoring and supervision. International supervision 
serves two main purposes: firstly, as Bosnia prepares itself for membership of 
NATO and the European Union (EU), the state will require considerable 
preparation and readiness.  Secondly, the entire progress made in stabilizing the 
Balkans rests on stabilizing the most difficult countries including Bosnia.  Balkan 
history reveals that one crisis can escalate and spread chaos and disorder 
across the entire Balkan region.1  Furthermore, the international community has 
invested over $15 billion and 16 years of effort to ensure that Bosnia does not 
return to violence.2 
Thesis Outline 
In pursuing the argument related to ethnic segregation, this thesis involves a 
case study analysis drawing from various sources of literature and resources. 
The thesis is organised in the following way: first, the current chapter will 
continue with a literature review of the relevant literature and resources related to 
the Bosnian conflict and defence reform.  The works of various scholars has 
been consulted in a bid to explore and understand the subject of this study.  The 
                                                             
1 http://www.radiobergen.org/serbia/balkania-filer/petkovic-albanian_terrorists.htm Accessed 4 Jan 2010) 
2 Dan Bilefsky, ‘Fears of New Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia’, New York Times, 13 December 2008, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/12/14/world/Europe/14bosnia.html (Accessed 4 Jan 2010) 
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literature review within this chapter will provide an overview of these scholars, 
highlighting their contribution and contradictions in comparison to others.   
Defence reform is always a difficult task, even more so in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina where the state has had to transition from state socialism to 
democracy.  The country has not only had to deal with the legacy of a recent 
bloody conflict but also the situation whereby two separate entities are asked to 
serve a single state; entities that are so ethnically fragmented.  Within this 
Chapter, the thesis will discuss Bosnia’s struggle to find a suitable platform to 
provide physical security to its inhabitants and to reform its defence policies.  
NATO is seen as the main promoter of defence reform within Europe and places 
top priority objectives for aspiring NATO members to fulfill within the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) framework as a prerequisite for NATO membership. 
Next, Chapter Two will include an analysis of negative ethnicity and democratic 
peace theory. These two concepts help inform the author’s analysis of Bosnia’s 
ethnic challenges and the progress of defence reform. Even as the progress of 
the defence reforms in Bosnia is discussed, one critical factor that emerges is the 
ethnic segregation that still exists within the defence organisation. This 
segregation is a representation of the various constituent ethnic groups that live 
within Bosnia. To better understand the persistence of these ethnic boundaries 
within the defence force, we therefore study the concept of negative ethnicity.3 
                                                             
3 Negative ethnicity is revealed when one ethnic group believes they are superior to other ethnic groups because their 
religion, food, culture, language or even their looks are better than the other. 
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This will involve exploring the concept of ethnicity with supporting analysis of the 
various models of ethnicity and how they may apply to the ethnic dilemma in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This supporting analysis offers a deeper understanding 
of the motivations that make it possible for people of a particular ethnic origin to 
be rallied behind a cause that apparently represents their common interests.  The 
thesis will also explore the subject of ethnic conflict to seek an understanding of 
the theory of democratic peace and how elements of democratic peace theory 
form the backbone of the democratic reforms in Bosnia and its influence on the 
progress of defence reform.  This will be discussed further within the Theoretical 
Framework in Chapter Two.  
Chapter Three will examine the background to the conflict in Bosnia. This will 
involve tracing the history of the Bosnian people back to the former Yugoslavia. 
This is essential in gaining an appreciation of the current challenges that the 
Bosnia defence forces are facing and how they can be approached. An analysis 
of the governance structure of Bosnia will also be undertaken to determine how 
the executive and the legislature are constituted and also how they relate with 
one another. More importantly, how these crucial governing bodies are helping 
the reformation of the defence forces. Finally, the chapter will study the role that 
the international community has played to restore peace and stability and the 
steps taken to ensure that there is lasting stability in Bosnia.   
Chapter Four will investigate the various factors that have caused the 
segregation of constituent armies within the country’s defence organisation. This 
chapter will consider the following questions: are the segregated armies a 
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function of the country’s history? Is it a product of political and/or social 
structures? Or is this merely a consequence of the provisions of the Dayton 
Peace Accords.4  
After looking at the causes of segregation within the Defence Forces, Chapter 
Five will examine the following question: how has ethnic segregation within the 
armed forces impacted the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Some of the 
issues highlighted in this chapter are how segregation has impacted the unity of 
command within the defence forces; the cost of operations; the unity within the 
defence sector; the international standing of the defence force and finally its 
capacity to contribute to international peace keeping initiatives and partner with 
NATO and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).   
This analysis will help support the central argument of the thesis, which is that 
ethnically segregated forces exacerbate lasting instability. 
Finally, Chapter Six will discuss the conclusions drawn from this study. The 
conclusion will reflect the concept of negative ethnicity in Bosnia and especially 
within its defence organisation; the contribution of the international community 
particularly in the reform of the defence forces and promoting sustainable peace; 
the causes of segregation amongst the defence forces and the effects of these 
divisions. 
 
                                                             
4 The Dayton Peace Accords is essentially a peace agreement and represents the negotiated framework that ended the 
war in Bosnia in 1995. 
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The Background to Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia    
The history of Bosnia and Herzegovina is filled with cases of multiple social 
cleavages that often threatened social relations. In the nineteenth century for 
instance, the prominent social divisions included religion, urban-rural and class 
systems. Worth noting is that the ethnic disparities that were associated with 
religious tradition and practice were yet to emerge or rather be politicised until 
the late nineteenth century.5 Therefore, the political elite in Yugoslavia employed 
economic experimentation, modernization, balancing, control and socialization in 
their quest to achieve communal cooperation. 6 
Prior to the conflict in the mid-1990s, the Communist Party of the former 
Yugoslavia had maintained stability in the region without the benefit of having 
democratic structures in place. This unique stability was achieved through the 
design of the Yugoslav federal system that purposefully regulated any conflict of 
national scale between the Republics and the various ethnic groups: if anything, 
the regime was the ultimate arbiter in the whole system.7 This engendered 
repression that hid behind the mask of apparent equanimity.  
                                                             
5 Donia, R. J.,& Fine, J. V.A. (1994) Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed , New York: Columbia University 
Press. p. 84  
6 Schoplin,G., (1993) ‘The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia’, in John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (eds), The Politics of 
Ethnic Conflict Regulation , London: Routledge. 
7 Sabrina, R., (1992) Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia , 2nd edn, Bloomington:Indiana University Press. 
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Through this arrangement the constitution was amended in 1974, which saw to 
the apparent devolution of administrative, social, economic and some political 
powers to the six republics and autonomous regions.8 The change to the 
constitution in 1974 prepared the ground for political disintegration in Yugoslavia, 
especially after the death of Marshall Tito in 1980. Indeed, Tito had managed to 
centralize and maintain control in Yugoslavia but after his death, the country 
began to fall into pieces as a number of ethnic entities began to oppose some of 
the political philosophies in the country, which dated back to 1920 when 
Yugoslavia was formed.9 
Throughout these developments the Croats viewed Yugoslavia as a 
decentralized federation whereas the Serbs regarded it as a highly centralized 
governed country.10 With a sizeable number of Croats and Serbs within its 
borders, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a time bomb. When Bosnia later 
seceded from Yugoslavia in 1992, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats 
suddenly found themselves isolated as ethnic minorities in a new state instead of 
belonging to the dominant ethnic entities within Yugoslavia. In these 
circumstances, the sense of security that had been guaranteed by collective 
                                                             
8 Xaxier, B., (1996) ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina State and Communitarianism’, in David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (eds), 
Yugoslavia and After, London: Longman, 1996, pp.67 - 115 
9 Lampe, J. R., 1999.  Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
10 Noel, M., (1994) Bosnia: A Short History. New York: New York University Press.  
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identity under communism was now replaced by ethnic nationalism, which could 
no longer support any democratic structures of governance. 11   
The political alignment of the populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina along 
ethnic lines clearly called for an external stimulus. The delay in taking collective 
action by the three ethnic blocks in the country can best be explained by what is 
referred to as the free rider dilemma, which comes about when individuals are 
reluctant to invest in the cost of participating in collective action if the success of 
such a move is uncertain and if many others will benefit without paying the cost 
in the event that the action taken succeeds. This dilemma was apparently broken 
during the election in 1990, since the cost of not voting along ethnic blocks was 
far outweighed by the much greater cost to individuals supposing they didn’t 
vote. The members of each ethnic block voted in the 1990 elections in line with 
their ethnic backgrounds with little regard to specific party policies. Arguably, they 
were motivated by fear of being politically and economically dominated by their 
rival ethnic communities. 12 
This led to the partition of Bosnia immediately after the elections: the Serbs 
established autonomous provinces across Bosnia whereas the Croats, who 
predominantly occupied the region in western Herzegovina, established their own 
monetary system. The Muslims who had dominated central Bosnia declined to 
                                                             
11 Zoran, P (1995) ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina: From Multiethnic Coexistence to “Apartheid” . . . and  Back’, in Payam Akhavan 
and Robert Howse, eds, Yugoslavia the Former and Future. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and Geneva: The 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 
12 Michael, H., Friedman, D., &  Appelbaum, M., (1982) ‘A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action’, International Migration 
Review 16(2): 412–434.   
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send conscripts to the Yugoslavian National Army and the Croat Listica; they 
also declined the passage of army convoys through their territory and as this 
went on the political construction of ethnic nationalism could not be reversed.13   
Andjelic argues that the perception that the recent conflict in Bosnia should be 
attributed to ethnic hatred collapses on the premise that the country historically 
demonstrated a significant degree of unity. For instance, the Bosnian military had 
in earlier times consisted of Muslim, Orthodox and Catholics who were referred 
to as Bosniaks. This goes a long way to proving that the much touted ethnic 
hatred was not widespread in Bosnian society and can be afforded little credence 
even in medieval history. Even though the existence of animosity between the 
different ethnic groups within Bosnia can hardly be dismissed, there were 
however, far more coexistence, tolerance and mutual understanding than were 
suppressed hatred or even open confrontation. Indeed most of the ethnic conflict 
in Bosnia is recorded in the twentieth century rather than the medieval period. 14 
 
Theories of ancient animosity that tend to explain the conflict in Bosnia are if 
anything, efforts to portray Bosnia as a failed state with no future. It is important 
that today’s strategic leaders in the Bosnian military take into consideration the 
lesson that history presents and employ them in addressing the challenges in the 
current military of Bosnia. History has demonstrated that Bosnia was a peaceful 
                                                             
13 Powers, G. F., (1996) ‘Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia’, Journal 
of International Affairs 50(1): 221–253. 
14 Andjelic, N., Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy (Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 6.  
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and a religious and ethnic tolerant country and it wasn’t until the turn of the 
nineteenth century did ethnic hatred become to take the centre stage in the 
government of Bosnia.15 
 
These ethnic and religious rivalries were not exclusive to Bosnia but are also 
evident in the region and across the globe. As an example, animosity between 
Catholics and Protestants in Western Europe remains prevalent. Bosnia is 
however unique in the sense that it has never been a nation state; not in the past 
or even today. Therefore any attempts to split Bosnia into two invariably leads to 
strife, a fact that is supported by the Karadjordjevo case: this case contains the 
resolution of a meeting held between Tudjman and Milosevic in March 1991.16  
 
Amongst the six republics of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was the most diverse in that it 
neither had a majority religious community or a majority national group at the 
same time.17 The subsequent break up of Yugoslavia invariably opened a bloody 
historical chapter in Bosnia. The political crisis in Yugoslavia saw to the Yugoslav 
People Army (JNA) adopting a neutral stand but the general ideology and ethnic 
composition of the JNA leadership quickly took Milosevic’s side. 18 
 
                                                             
15 Ibid, p.5.  
16 Ibid, p.19. 
17 Rogel, C.,  The Breakup Of Yugoslavia And War In Bosnia (Greenwood Press, 1998), 9. 
18  Gow, J., Legitimacy and Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers Limited, 1992), 142.  
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Gow provides the statistical representation of the ethnic groups in the Yugoslav 
national military. Sixty percent of the military personnel were Serbs, a meager 5.4 
percent were the so called Yugoslavs whereas the Montenegrins were about 6.2 
percent.19 Despite this difference the military reflected the perspective of 
Yugoslavia, which matched that of the neo-Communist Serbian leadership. The 
ethnic distribution of the rest of the military officers consisted of 6.3 percent of 
Macedonians, 2.4 percent of Muslims, 12.6 percent of Croats, 2.8 percent of 
Slovenes, 0.6 percent of Hungarians, 0.7 percent of Albanians while other 
minorities too up 1.6 percent.20 The political attitudes of these other military 
officers were generally expected to be leaning towards a communist orientation 
yet they were less likely to find Milosevic as being an attractive option.  
 
In a survey that was carried out by the World Bank after the war, it was 
established that the most prominent social cleavages included the rural to urban 
heritage, war experience and ethnicity.21 According to Burg and Shoup, the three 
constituent ethnic nationalities in Bosnia have a tradition of both conflict and 
accommodation that adversely conflict with each other.22 As the ethnic gap 
                                                             
19 Ibid, p.9.  
20 Ibid, p.9-10. 
21 ‘A social assessment of Bosnia and Hercegovina’, The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region, Environmentally 
and Socially Sustainable Development Unit. Washington D.C.1999.  
22 Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S., (2000) The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. M.E. 
Sharpe Inc., 14.   
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widened between 1966 and 1990, the conflict between the regional political elite 
become more severe as they struggled for power. This environment was 
conducive for the breakdown of social legitimacy and regional devolution; it also 
encouraged economic downturn and mass frustration amongst the populace.  
The political elite took advantage of this situation to entrench animosity between 
the various ethnic entities. 23   
There were at least three major issues being contested in Bosnia as the 
nationalist leadership mobilized their communities and the republic descended 
into war. The most basic contest was over defining the nature of rights in Bosnia: 
were they to be seen as residing in individuals or in the ethnic communities as 
collective entities? Neither the distant Bosnian past, nor the immediate 
communist era past, provided any clear answer to this question. The second 
major contest unleashed in Bosnia by the disintegration of Yugoslavia was over 
the ‘national’ question.24  
 
Burg and Shoup note that as commonly used in Eastern Europe the term 
‘national’ has been applied to all aspects of inter-ethnic relations. But its most 
important element concerned defining the right to claim titular or state 
constituting status that are often a reserve of the majority ethnic groups and the 
definition of rights that should be accorded to the minority groups. In the 
                                                             
23 Cohen, L. J., (1995) Broken Bonds, 2nd Edn, Boulder: Westview Press.  
24 Ibid, p.6.  
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attainment of the state constituting status conferred superior cultural and political 
rights on a group, including control over the state itself.25  
 
It can therefore be concluded that the struggle over rights and the struggle over 
the national questions were thus intertwined in Bosnia, as elsewhere throughout 
Eastern Europe. But they were of fateful significance for Bosnia, which was a 
multi-ethnic state that had no single group that could claim titular status on the 
account of numbers alone and therefore all the three members vied for the status 
of a state-constituting nation. Due to the fact that Bosnia was surrounded by 
Croats and Serbs, who were the more powerful states amongst the two of the 
groups contesting over these issues; this made it increasingly hard for the 
contest over rights and the national questions in Bosnia to be resolved without 
the participation of Croatia and Serbia.26  
 
The Report by Nansen Dialogue Centre points out that Bosnia is still in the 
process of developing a truly democratic culture, whereby the citizens expect and 
demand for accountability from their political leaders and the politicians on their 
part risk not being re-elected if they fail to deliver on their promises. In Bosnia, 
this process is complicated by the ethno-political nature of its governance 
system. This is because the Dayton Peace Accords institutionalized ethnicity as 
                                                             
25 Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S., (2000) The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. M.E. 
Sharpe Inc., p.4-8.   
26 Further reading of Burg and Shoup, 2000, proposes the two academic approaches to these issues: the pluralist and 
the power sharing approaches, p.6-7.  
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a determinant of power and this provides the opportunity for the political class to 
exploit the ethnic divisions.27 
The Nansen report further states that the political parties in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are easily identified by their ethnic affiliations rather than the 
positions that they hold on the left-right spectrum. Subsequently, the political 
class often concentrates on ethno – nationalist issues at the expense of 
developmental issues such as corruption and unemployment. The electorate on 
their part shows preference to the candidates from their own ethnic backgrounds.  
Whether this is motivated by the perceived lack of alternatives or the fear of other 
ethnic entities, the result of it all is that most elections conducted in the country 
have borne little, if any, dramatic change on the political landscape. 28 
It is worth noting that one of the key features of the Bosnian conflict was the 
sense of nationalism that was demonstrated by the parties during the war.  For 
one, they identified themselves as nations and the major goal of their leaders 
was to marshal territorial domination over their rivals and establish a state that 
will be identified by ethnic domination. These ethnic leaders had envisioned 
dominating all areas that encompassed Bosnia and Herzegovina.29  
                                                             
27 The Missing Peace: The need for a long term strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
(August, 2010) Nansen Dialogue Centre, Sarajevo and Safer World. Available at: 
http://www.humanitarianforum.org/data/files/bosnia.pdf (Accessed on May 10, 2011) 
 
28 Ibid.     
29 See, Singer, B, J., Nationalism and Dehostilization. Quoted in: Potter, N, N., Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating 
Policy on Local and Global Level. Rodopi. This was an invited paper at the conference on The United Nations at Fifty 
(1945-1995): At the Threshold of a New World Order, which was held at Hofstra University in March 16-18, 1995.  
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Security Sector Reform in the Post-Conflict 
Environment 
 
Security sector reform is a general term used to describe the structures, 
institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and 
oversight of security in a country.  Factors shaping the reform of the security 
sector include: history and tradition; national security environment and ideology; 
regional and international influence; and the type of governance.30  According to 
the United Nations, “the overarching objective of security sector reform is to 
ensure that the security institutions perform their functions efficiently and 
effectively in an environment consistent with democratic norms and the principles 
of good governance and the rule of law, thereby promoting human security.”31 
In post-conflict countries such as Bosnia, the restoration of stability, the 
acceptance of legitimacy of political government institutions and the return of the 
rule of law and power ceded to the government are all predicated on the ability to 
provide security to the people of the country.  Security, both internal and external 
is the most important deliverable that a state government can provide its citizens.  
The ability to provide effective security to its citizens is a sign that the state has a 
monopoly or full control over the use of force within its borders. In the post 
conflict environment, law enforcement, criminal justice, border control and the 
                                                             
30 Lecture provided to the author and the NZDF Command and Staff College by Dr Roubin Azizian at the 
Asia Pacific Centre of Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii 21-22 November 2011. 
31 UN Security Council Statement, 21 February 2008. 
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ability to enforce security usually dissolves.  Occasionally, these capabilities 
remain in some form but are no longer seen to be legitimate.  Subsequently, 
these institutions are often replaced by military forces until an acknowledged and 
legitimate government can provide the necessary police force and legal system. 
Thus security sector reform in post conflict states, including the reinforcement of 
diplomacy, democratic ideals and internal security often falls to military forces 
that have the responsibility to restore these aspects of governance to functional 
levels.  After military intervention, the desired end state is a stable, developing 
and legitimate government that can ensure domestic security and state 
sovereignty. Citizens expect that their government will provide security and the 
maintenance of law and order.  The ability of the state government to provide 
internal and external security through a monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
is an important feature in defining state sovereignty.  In failed and failing states 
some of the security issues identified in the literature include: (a) war and civil 
strife, (b) crime and violence, (c) negative effects of police and military forces, 
and (d) a lack of justice within society.32  Without basic security and law and 
order, other government functions cannot effectively be fulfilled.  Research 
indicates that everyday public services cannot be provided if providers fear for 
their safety and government institutions such as parliament and courts cannot 
function if officials cannot be protected from harm or injury.33  
                                                             
32  Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A .., 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB925.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011). 
33 Ibid 
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In most recent conflicts, a vacuum in security, defence and government 
legitimacy has emerged immediately after hostilities.  Peacekeeping forces have 
assumed many of the responsibilities in these areas.  Military forces assume 
responsibilities that are normally integrated into the international efforts prior to a 
secure environment being established such as the 1999 UN intervention in 
Kosovo which saw peacekeeping forces from contributing countries become 
imbedded in the transitional administration prior to the arrival of non 
governmental organisations (NGO’s).34  It is in these instances that the military 
takes on the responsibility to provide security for the population and carry out 
basic court and judicial functions and establishes the foundations for 
governmental infrastructure to be restored.  It is this security that allows for the 
restoration of stability, which leads to acknowledged governmental legitimacy 
and ultimately prosperity. 
 
The idea of security and the legitimacy of the state to provide services to its 
citizens are best described by Max Weber, who linked the state with the 
legitimate means of force.35  He defined the state as the “political community 
which within a certain territory claims for itself (with success) a monopoly of 
                                                             
34 UN Security Resolution 1244 available from http://www.unmikonline.org/Documents/Res1244ENG.pdf (Accessed 3 
October 2011) 
35 Max Weber, Politik asl Beruf.” Gesammelte Politische Schriften, trans J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), (Tubingen, 
Germany, (1919) 1988), 506. 
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legitimate physical coercion.”36  Also indicating the centrality of coercion in 
conceptualizing the state, Weber included “the protection of personal security 
and public order (police)” as one of the important functions of the state.37   
The rule of law is an important element in strengthening security and security 
sector reform.  When implemented and enforced it becomes the basis of equality 
and provides legitimacy to governments, security forces and citizens.38  The rule 
of law also provides the foundation for the integration of ethnically segregated 
forces in order to achieve a credible defence force under a single command 
structure.  According to Francis Fukuyama, “The rule of law was originally rooted 
in religion in all societies where it came to prevail, including the West. The great 
economist Friedrich Hayek noted that law should be prior to legislation.  That is, 
the law should reflect a broad social consensus on the rules of justice.”39   The 
rule of law is the principle where all persons, institutions, and entities (both public 
and private) as well the state itself are accountable to laws that are publically 
shared, enforced and independently arbitrated consistent with international 
human rights law and other international standards.40  It is the idea that the 
                                                             
36  Ibid, 506 
37 Ibid, 122 
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population submit themselves to a government in exchange for basic services 
that include security, safety and stability; it is the contract that citizens adapt to 
societal norms with the expectation for normalcy.  In most post-conflict countries 
this relationship disintegrates as the conflict and combat ends.  As the security 
situation dissolves and legitimate governmental institutions disappear, military 
forces normally assume the responsibility to restore some semblance of security. 
This approach represents an important link to Bosnia’s defence reform efforts as 
the state strives to overcome the effects of ethnic tension to unite its armed 
forces to provide the state government with a monopoly over the use of force.  As 
mentioned earlier, the rule of law provides the foundation for the integration of 
ethnically segregated forces in order to achieve a credible defence force under a 
single command structure and become capable of defending the sovereign state 
and fulfilling any future international obligations that may present itself.  It is here 
that a significant obstacle remains.   
There has been little reconciliation among the ethnic entities in Bosnia since the 
cessation of hostilities in 1995.41  The key political parties continue to struggle 
over the basic issues that started the war nearly twenty years ago and 
international concern over the political situation in Bosnia is increasing with 
nationalist rhetoric encouraging ethnic division and a risk of descent into 
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violence.42  The major risk lies with a threat by Bosnian Serb Prime Minister 
Milord Dodik to hold a referendum on independence for the Republika Srpska.43  
Croatian President, Stjepan Mesic retorted that should the Republika Srpska 
secede from Bosnia; that he would intervene with the Croatian Armed Forces.44 
Bosnia has been without violence since the international intervention in 1995 but 
an important point here is that the end of the war did not signal the end of the 
conflict.  Fundamental issues remain unsolved and the main issue confronting 
the international community today is how long intervening actors should remain 
in Bosnia and in what form.45 The immediate question is whether to close the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR) and pass authority to an EU Special 
Representative, which will have a considerably weaker mandate.46  Critics have 
claimed that that the international presence and the OHR in particular only 
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encourage separatism and ethnic nationalism and work against ethnic 
reconciliation.47    
From a military perspective, a return to hostilities would result in the 
disintegration of the defence reforms accomplished under NATO and OSCE 
guidance since 2005.  The Dayton Peace Accords divided Bosnia into two 
opposing sides with two separate armies, the Bosniak-Croat Army of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army of the 
Republika Srpska, each with its own chain of command.  This structure remained 
intact for ten years following the war until High Representative Paddy Ashdown 
set about integrating the separate armies into a single unified Bosnian Defence 
Force.  The unity of the Bosnian Defence Force may therefore be considered the 
principle preventative for the resumption of hostilities.  Although the defence 
reforms have seen impressive progress, they were more ‘top down’ in nature – 
meaning that the general staffs and multinational brigades were created, but the 
lower level units remained separate and are not integrated.  Bosnian Serb 
soldiers remain in barracks located in the Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-
Croat soldiers in turn, remain within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.48 
Full integration of the armed forces within Bosnia remains elusive, made even 
more difficult by the prevailing view by both politicians and much of the 
population who still view Bosnia as a state comprising two separate entities.  
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The next section will introduce the reader to defence reform as a concept and 
why it is a critical element of any post-conflict security sector reform, this will be 
covered in more depth within Chapter Three.  Defence reform is the essential 
foundation for creating modern forces and defence capabilities to meet the needs 
of the state and to meet its obligations internally and externally.  Membership to 
the NATO security alliance and other European alliances underpin the defence 
reform efforts underway in Bosnia and provide the framework for defence reform 
to occur.  Key elements within this process are NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
Programme (PfP)49 and the NATO Membership Action Plan.50   These elements 
are important as they lay the foundation for the reform of the defence forces in 
Bosnia and support wider democratic reform efforts underway in Bosnia.  The 
PfP and the NATO Membership Action Plan will be analysed in more depth in 
Chapter Three. 
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Defence Reform 
Defence reform is an essential component of post-conflict security sector reform 
and is a necessary and first step in building a climate of stability.  Defence reform 
implies a change in the ways of doing business, of mentality on defence related 
issues, of objectives, of resource allocations and priorities.51   
The June 2005 Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina acknowledges 
the importance of the reform of the defence sector, stating that “the defence 
reforms, as part of the overall reforms in our country, by size, content and 
objective significance, are the strongest mechanism for strengthening internal 
stability and also to support the credibility in efforts for the integration of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina into European and Euro-Atlantic integration structures.”52  The 
reform of the defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina commenced in 2003 
with the establishment of the Defence Reform Commission.  The aims of the 
reform effort were to establish a common defence organisation with 
consideration given to the prevailing security environment and economic 
realities. 
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Prior to the start of the defence reform process, the state’s defence organisation 
faced very complex problems and the reform efforts were therefore directed 
towards their resolution.  The 2005 White Paper refers to the reform agenda 
being derived from an analysis of the following factors: 53 
• Inadequate State-level command and control of the Armed Forces; 
• Ambiguities and inconsistencies regarding State and entity authorities in 
defence matters; 
• Insufficient parliamentary oversight and control of the Armed Forces; 
• Lack of transparency in defence matters at all levels; 
• Non-compliance with international commitments, particularly politico-
military aspects of relevant OSCE documents; 
• The size, structure and equipment of the Armed Forces, which were not 
commensurate with real defence and security requirements; 
• Disproportionate funding for defence activities; 
• Deteriorating arms and ammunition stored at an excessive number of 
inappropriate locations; and 
• Poor conditions of service for the full-time and conscript components of 
the Armed Forces. 
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If there was one issue that all political parties in Bosnia seem to agree upon it is 
the commitment to join Euro-Atlantic structures, namely the EU and the NATO 
alliance.54 Joining the NATO alliance does not just have military and political 
benefits; it has economic and social significance as well. However one of the key 
benefits of joining NATO applies to the military profession itself. NATO 
membership improves the professionalisation and modernisation of the armed 
forces of each member state. Such improved effectiveness of the armed forces 
implies indirect and direct benefits, such as better security perceptions of the 
country and its environment, as well as increasing investment in the defence 
sector and infrastructure.55 
 
The government of Bosnia first expressed an interest of gaining membership to 
the EU and NATO in June 2001 when the NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Robertson visited the country.56 The UN Secretary General laid out a number of 
requirements and preconditions that Bosnia needed to undertake for the process 
to begin. These reforms demanded that Bosnia adopt the State Defence Law and 
that it guarantee democratic and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces; it 
was also required to form a Ministry of Defense (MoD) and ensure that there is 
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transparency in the military budget. Additionally, Bosnia was required to equip 
and offer common training across its forces to standards acceptable to other 
NATO member countries and also strengthen state level institutions.57 Although 
joining the two institutions are two separate processes, meeting the criteria for 
entry into EU and NATO proceed in many areas side by side. Joining NATO’s 
PfP program is an important step on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration. 58   
NATO introduced PfP at the Brussels Summit meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in January 2004 to enhance peace, stability and security throughout 
Europe.  Article two of the PfP framework document states that “This partnership 
is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in 
the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common 
action.”59  The PfP also states that “protection and promotion of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace 
through democracy are shared values fundamental to the partnership.”60  In 
addition to these basic principles, “states subscribing to this document recall that 
they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom 
from coercion and intimidation and the maintenance of the principles of 
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international law.”61  This framework has established a solid basis for Bosnia to 
progress reform and actively builds a better security framework. 
A significant element of the PfP is the Planning And Review Process (PARP) 
which provides a means to “identify forces and capabilities which might be 
available for multi-national training exercises and operations in conjunction with 
Alliance forces.”62 The PARP provides the mechanism for Bosnia to provide 
detail about their ongoing reforms related to defence matters.  “The information is 
provided in response to a ‘survey of overall PfP operability’ issued by NATO in 
the autumn every second year.  Participating countries also provide an extensive 
overview of their armed forces and detailed information of the forces which they 
are prepared to make available for PfP cooperation.”63 After a participating 
country has provided the relevant information, NATO provides a Planning and 
Review Assessment with clearly defined Partnership Goals.  In order to assist the 
Armed Forces to become capable of participating in joint operations with other 
NATO member states.  The Planning and Review Assessment and the 
Interoperability Objectives are approved by the Alliance and the partner state 
concerned.64  The PARP provides a great deal of incentive in preparing Bosnia 
and other prospective countries for NATO membership.  Many nations have used 
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the PARP as a means to overcome obstacles and create modern, compatible, 
professional, well equipped and democratically responsible armed forces.65 
NATO’s PfP has been an essential element in providing the framework for 
Bosnia’s defence reform efforts and has assisted the Bosnia armed forces unite 
under state level control.  NATO, in recognising the progress made in reforming 
Bosnia’s armed forces, declared in 2009 that Bosnia will progress to the next 
phase which is the Membership Action Plan (MAP) once further progress has 
been made.  The MAP and the provisions within are worthy of mention as this 
process will play a crucial role in the future progress of Bosnia’s reform efforts 
and its goal of joining the NATO alliance. 
The MAP was established in 1999 in response to lessons learnt from the process 
undergone by Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to full NATO 
membership.66  Jeffrey Simon of the US National Defence University lists four 
essential MAP provisions: 
1. An Annual National Plan that identifies specific targets ranging 
political/economic, defence, resource, security and legal dimensions of 
NATO membership. 
2. A mechanism for providing feedback in order for NATO members and 
the partner state to track and assess progress. 
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3. A process for coordinating security assistance from NATO members to 
the partner state. 
4. Comprehensive defence planning at the state level that creates and 
reviews progress and planning targets.67 
 
During the MAP process, meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
and the aspirant country occur frequently to discuss difficulties and develop 
mutually agreed plans.  NATO military and civilian experts are present during 
these meetings to discuss with representatives from the aspirant country the 
issues pertaining to NATO membership.68  The MAP process has also made a 
considerable contribution to the NATO Alliance by ensuring that new NATO 
members are actually capable of participating and contributing to the Alliance’s 
collective defence and peace support operations.  Moore comments that 
“According to diplomatic representatives from those states invited to join the 
Alliance in Prague in 2002, MAP served to shape internal political debates over 
both domestic and foreign policy by providing leverage for the reformist elements 
of their society.  One called it the ‘bible’ for NATO membership and observed that 
the process had served as a ‘mirror’ in front of his ‘states’ reform efforts.”69 
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In analyzing the prospects for Bosnia to join the NATO Alliance, it must be 
acknowledged that Bosnia has played an active part in NATO’s evolution post 
Cold War.  The stakes in Bosnia for the future of the NATO Alliance are 
significant due to the considerable investment of US and allied nation’s political 
effort to date.  The former US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy commented 
in 1996 that “Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in Bosnia, so 
too is the future of NATO itself.  It is in Bosnia where all sixteen members of 
NATO, each one making a contribution, are sending the message that NATO is 
the bedrock on which the future security and stability of Europe will be built.  It is 
in Bosnia that we are demonstrating that NATO can meet new challenges.”70  
 
Noting Bosnia’s key role in NATO transformation and enlargement since the 
early 1990’s and the political-military stakes with Bosnia and Europe itself, 
Bosnia is expected to play a significant role in the future of NATO.  The Western 
Balkans is a very delicate region that has the potential to ignite into violence very 
easily if the situation is not kept under control.  This happened in 1992 and 
caught the international community by surprise.  The NATO Enlargement 
Process enhances stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.  By 
accepting Bosnia into the NATO community, NATO will be sending the message 
that security and stability in Bosnia and the remainder of Europe will be 
enhanced and kept under control.   
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As discussed earlier in this section, despite the reform efforts and progress to 
date, key political parties within Bosnia continue to struggle over the basic issues 
that started the war nearly 20 years ago and this is reflected within the wider 
Bosnian society.  There has been very little reconciliation among the ethnic 
communities, therefore ethnicity will continue to challenge defence reform efforts 
and Bosnia’s journey towards NATO and EU membership.  
 
Methodology     
The method that a researcher selects to conduct a study is largely determined by 
the research question and nature of the social phenomenon that the researcher 
is investigating.71 In 1998, the author served in Bosnia as a Staff Officer in the 
British Headquarters of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR), responsible for the 
authorisation and monitoring of the military training and movement activities of 
the Entity Armed Forces and ensuring that the Entities complied with the military 
aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord.  Today, seventeen years on from the 
cessation of hostilities and fourteen years following the author’s deployment in 
Bosnia, commentators continue to debate the fragility of Bosnia, as it is largely 
ethnic tension that continues to challenge peace in Bosnia.  Recently there have 
been incidents that have raised ethnic tension to a level not seen for years and 
the western powers seem unable or unwilling to effectively deal with the rising 
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nationalist rhetoric and rising social and political tensions.72  This may be 
explained by the western focus on Afghanistan. International officials fear that 
these events could threaten to unravel the progress made in security and 
defence reform.   The author’s aim therefore is to analyse the progress of 
defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with particular attention to the role of 
ethnicity within the armed forces.  
The method selected to carry out this analyses will be by illustrative case study 
and will take on a descriptive approach as the author establishes to achieve the 
aims of the thesis. 73  A descriptive approach describes the natural phenomenon 
in narrative form.  A case study is a comprehensive analysis of a single 
phenomenon of interest in order to offer the understandings in a particular 
context.  The author considers the case study as a suitable method in which to 
reflect on the lessons learned and to analyse the impact of ethnicity in one 
particular case.  This is also a qualitative study given the interest of the 
researcher who seeks insight and interpretation of the problem at hand.  
Qualitative studies are often employed in social sciences and they focus mainly 
on the process and interpretation of the research subject.74  
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The progress of the reforms of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
be analysed, seeking to understand the challenges and obstacles that impact on 
this process with particular attention to the unity in the defence forces and the 
impact of the ethnic divide within the defence forces.  In order to effectively 
consider the impact of ethnic division and tensions within the defence forces, this 
study begins with consideration of the concept of ethnicity.  Negative ethnicity is 
central to the Bosnian conflict, if not as a cause but as a catalyst; therefore the 
views by various scholars on this subject will be collected and analysed.  This is 
imperative to support the central argument of this study; it is also crucial in the 
quest to explain the pace at which the reform of the armed forces on Bosnia has 
been carried out. 
The available literature on the conflict preceding this process of security reform in 
Bosnia will be crucial in shedding additional light on the genesis of the conflict 
and even pointing towards a more constructive solution to the problem at hand.  
The research will seek to establish from the available literature the attitudes of 
the stakeholders and how the existing defence structures ensure that there is 
sustainable peace in the country.  
Literature Review    
A review of the literature that has shaped the understanding of the central 
arguments in this thesis will now be carried out. The review will provide an 
overview of the literature related to the conflict in Bosnia, defence reform, as well 
as literature related to the concept of ethnicity; the models of ethnicity; ethnic 
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conflict and the concept of negative ethnicity in Bosnia. The review will also 
examine the literature that addresses the role of the international community in 
the stabilization of Bosnia and also the historical perspective of the conflict in 
Bosnia to provide context. The literature review will then discuss what various 
scholars believe are the causes of segregation within the defence force and the 
implication that ethnic segregation of the defence organisation has on the 
security of the state.   
An Overview of the Literature on the Introduction and Methodology   
Early in the first chapter of this study, the background that supports the central 
argument of this thesis and the research methodology adopted was discussed. 
Šajinović outlines the importance of defence reforms in Bosnia to the 
international community, while McMahony discusses the political situation in 
Bosnia, focusing on the ethno-centricity of the political parties and their impact on 
the defence reforms in particular and peace prospects in general. 75 
The introductory section also discusses the fragile nature of the political situation 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in light of the recent threats by President 
Dodik to hold a referendum to decide whether Republika Srpska should secede 
from Bosnia. The Balkan Insight provides a glimpse into the possible 
consequences of such action and the views of the international community.76  
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Additionally Knaus discusses the involvement of various international 
organizations in Bosnia and their role in stabilizing the country through the 
reforms in the defence force. 77 
An Overview of the Literature on the Theoretical Framework   
Chapter Two of this study examines the theoretical framework.  The theoretical 
framework will discuss the various concepts that arise in the process of analyzing 
the progress of defence reform in Bosnia and will address the concept of 
negative ethnicity. Even though the causes of the conflict in Bosnia can regarded 
as being political, negative ethnicity played a key role in fueling the conflict and 
even ensuring that the defence forces of each entity remain separate from one 
another. Therefore, understanding the ethnic question in Bosnia is central in 
understanding the progress of defence reform and also in determining strategies 
that may offer long term solutions to this challenge. Kenyan politician and writer 
Koigi Wa Wamwere coined the term ‘negative ethnicity’ in an attempt to explain 
ethnic rivalries in Africa and how it became a popular concept used to undermine 
attempts at democracy.  According to Wamwere, negative ethnicity is revealed 
when one ethnic group believes they are superior to other ethnic groups because 
their religion, food, culture, language or even their looks are better.78  This 
assumed ethnic superiority is not isolated to the African continent, it is also 
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prevalent in many western bi-cultural and multi-cultural societies where people 
from different ethnicities cohabitate together, an example being Northern Ireland 
where negative ethnicity is prevalent between Catholic and Protestants or in 
America between African-Americans and white Americans.  In the Former 
Yugoslavia the author argues that negative ethnicity was key contributor to the 
tensions that existed between Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Albanians 
which ultimately led to the conflict in Bosnia in the mid 1990’s.  
 
The conflict that occurred in Bosnia was fought along ethnic lines and when the 
international community intervened and stopped the fighting with the signing of 
the Dayton Peace Accords, it used the ethnic phenomena in the country to quell 
the violence.  The Bosnian conflict surprised many historians because the ethnic 
groups had lived for decades, even centuries without resolving their differences 
through violent means.  By discussing negative ethnicity in this study, the thesis 
attempts to understand the motivations behind the conflict by looking at the 
theoretical underpinnings behind them. 
The first step in understanding negative ethnicity in Bosnia is to define the 
concept of ethnicity. In Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches, Yang points out 
that there need not be contention about the concept of ethnicity; that the 
contention on this issue is a function of the various definitions that ethnicity has 
been given. He ties the concept of ethnicity to the primordial bond, which he 
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argues, sustains ethnicity by bringing people together to protect and preserve 
their identity and interest. 79  
In the paper titled, Ethni-political Warfare: Cause, Consequences and Possible 
Solutions, Jowitt views ethnicity as a political concept that is created to mobilise 
ethnic blocks to pursue and protect the shared interests of a community. 80  This 
definition best supports the ethnic cleavages within Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
suggests that multi-ethnic states mobilise along ethnic lines to protect their 
respective territory.  Scherrer expands on Jowitt’s definition by discussing 
aspects such as history, culture and biological features to identify the people of 
particular ethnicity.81 His approach is integrative and serves as an appropriate 
background to the politicization of ethnicity as proposed by Jowitt.  
To fully understand Jowitt’s definition of ethnicity and how this definition applies 
to the ethnic segregation in Bosnia, Chapter Two analyses the models of 
ethnicity, which offer an explanation as to why a people who consider themselves 
as belonging to a particular ethnic community are normally susceptible to the 
manipulation by the political elites and the ethnic entrepreneurs within their 
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community. Ethnic blocks are mobilized under the pretext of fighting for their 
political and economic interests. Through the literature covered in this chapter, it 
becomes clear that what is often referred to as common political and economic 
interests of an ethnic group is in essence a representation of a political and/or 
economic goal set by the politicians. This is often a personal selfish goal, sold as 
an ideology in order to rally the ethnic populace. But why do people succumb to 
this? In the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, the thesis presents 
three approaches that can be used to better understand the ethnic phenomena 
and provide some explanation to the ethnic motivations within Bosnian society 
and how the ethnic phenomena can create difficulties within society and indeed 
create an obstacle to the reform of the country’s defence forces.  There is little 
hope for a fully ethnically integrated defence force to exist without successful 
integration of the wider community.  A good understanding of the ethnic 
phenomenon is therefore critical for Bosnia to progress in its reform efforts and to 
overcome its ethnic difficulties.  These three approaches include the primordial, 
instrumental and the constructivist approach.  
The supporters of the primordial approach include Fearson; Oberschall, 
Rabushka and Shepsle. Oberschall notes that by sharing culture, historical and 
biological roots, people of an ethnic group have the tendency of becoming a 
political entity.82 But Rabushka and Shepsle refrain from labeling the definition of 
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ethnicity to a people sharing historical, biological and cultural roots; they argue 
that ethnic blocks are defined by the people sharing the similar interest in public 
policies.83 It therefore includes people who do not necessarily share common 
ancestry, hence cultural and biological history. Fearson supports Rabushka and 
Shepsle’s view by claiming that ethnic groups often have different preferences 
whenever it comes to the types of public goods such as education, employment 
and health opportunities.84  This view is important as it links the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia to the primordial sentiments amongst the ethnic entities. 
Having shared the same history, it became convenient for various ethnicities 
within Yugoslavia to unite and fight for their independence. This was true of the 
ethnic group that seceded from Yugoslavia to form the new country of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
In looking at the instrumentalist approach, Fearson provides a background to this 
school of thought. He argues that ethnic communities are taken as instruments to 
be used by politicians in bargaining for power.85 Fearson also introduces the 
question of social relevance of an ethnic group in a nation state, a factor that is 
closely related to the political relevance of its people. Yuri builds on this concept 
and reveals that social relevance has led to the formation of political parties 
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along ethic lines especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where ethnicity cannot be 
separated from politics. 86 
Gagnon contributes to the constructivist approach by claiming that both religious 
and ethnic issues are susceptible to manipulation by the political class, he 
however cautions that to better understand this approach; it must be 
supplemented with the ethnic polarization and conflict escalation model. Herz on 
his part pours light on a number of short comings of this approach, citing that the 
persuasions by political players only work when fear of the unknown is instilled in 
a people. Lake and Rothchild87 and Malender88  expand on Herz’s view, however 
Stein argues that whenever the state fails to protect its citizens they are left with 
little choice but to embrace any ethnic initiatives that promise to guarantee their 
protection; this happens most frequently during the political transition. 89   
Chapter Two discusses ethnic conflict and its cause. Brubaker and Laitin 
challenge the effort to attribute ethnic conflict to ethnicity. They point out that 
there are other pertinent factors that create ethnic conflict and that ethnicity in 
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itself is merely used as a catalyst.90 Chaim builds on the Brubaker and Laitin 
argument by exposing the connection between ethnicity and conflict.91 This 
argument is rebutted by Scherrer who offers a number of reasons that lead 
ethnic communities to take up arms against each other.92 The reasons range 
from political to cultural to religious to economic.  Scherrer, supported by Burg 
and Shoup regard ethnic conflict as a class struggle within a society, as ethnic 
groups compete for social, political and economic power.93 They cite the growth 
of liberal democracy following the demise of communism in Eastern Europe as 
the cause of the ethnic strife that was witnessed in the Balkans.  
On the other hand, Wolff also refutes Brubaker and Laitin’s conception of ethnic 
violence. Wolff bases his argument on the end results of any ethnic strife: the 
success and failure of such a conflict is always attributed to the affected ethnic 
group.94 In this way, as Geisen et al., observe ethnicity has thus become a sure 
blueprint for determining collective action whenever circumstances dictate. 95   
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After examining the various shades of ethnicity; its models and what constitutes 
an ethnic conflict, this thesis explores the concept of ethnic conflict in the context 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to understand the underlying causes 
of the conflict in Bosnia in order to encourage reconciliation between the ethnic 
factions and to overcome ethnic related obstacles that impede the process of 
defence reform.  Donia96 and Schoplin97 offer a comprehensive background of 
the ethnic situation in the former Yugoslavia. Both Hodson et al.,98 and Dragomir 
99 add to the dynamics of ethnicity before and during the break out of conflict in 
Bosnia. Other scholars who contribute to this subject include Lampe,100 Noel,101 
and Zoran.102 
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Michael et al. and Powers discuss the partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines.103  
Andjelic notes that the present ethnic divisions in the Bosnian society cannot be 
blamed solely on the country’s history. 104  This is in view of the fact that the 
ethnic entities had previously shared a history of peaceful coexistence that had 
stretched back to medieval times. This argument is explained by Gow who offers 
the statistics in percentages of the representation of each ethnic group in the 
Yugoslav military. 105   
The World Bank report titled, ‘A Social Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ 
discusses the politicization of ethnicity in Bosnia. Burg and Shoup;106 Dragomir 
and Cohen support this notion.107 They concur that the political class created 
tension within Bosnia in order for them to achieve their political interests, which 
included autonomy. Further more, Burg and Shoup also raised the issue of ethnic 
nationalism, which was at the heart of the conflict between 1992 and 1995.  
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Finally Chapter Two discusses democratic peace theory. Clemens provides us 
with the definition of the theory, which he bases from the ideas that were put 
forward by Kant.108 Fischer demonstrates the link between liberalism and 
democracy; how the two work together to promote peace, which is a prerequisite 
to social, economic and political development. 109 Frank and Richmond place the 
theory in context by applying it into the prevailing ethnic tensions in Bosnia and 
regard it as a failure of the liberal peace praxis. 110  They too explore the nature 
of the relationship between the international community, the national government 
and the citizens of Bosnia.   
An Overview of the Literature on Security Sector Reform 
Academics still debate the best way to effect post-conflict security sector reform.  
Some support the notion of ‘security first’ and others place priority on 
‘democratisation’. 111  Fen Osler Hampsen and Davis Mendeloff claim that 
“establishing security and basic political stability should be the first, if not the only 
objective of international interventions.  Such interventions in an ideal world 
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should leave viable states and have the capacity and instrumental authority to 
manage their own internal security affairs because the alternative – a relapse into 
anarchy and violence – is a far worse outcome.”112  Larry Diamond adds that in 
post conflict environments where the state has collapsed, security is the most 
critical element that supports everything.  Without even a minimal level of 
security, the state cannot conduct trade or commerce, rebuild their homes and 
communities or participate effectively in politics.  Without security the state is left 
in a state of disorder and distrust.  As Diamond quotes “an utterly Hobbesian 
situation in which fear and raw force dominates.” 113 In contrast, those that 
support democratisation as a priority argue that holding elections and passing 
responsibility to local authorities as quickly as possible should be the priority for 
the international community.114 
 
An Overview of the Literature on the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina   
While exploring the background of the conflict in Bosnia in Chapter Three, the 
thesis no longer concentrates on the ethnic issues involved but rather looks at a 
broad spectrum of factors that brought about the conflict and how each factor 
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affected the other. Singer emphasizes the need to research the history of the 
tensions in the former Yugoslavia, since it is from here that the current Bosnian 
stagnation stems.115 In a similar vein, Andersen and Birgit emphasize an 
understanding of this history, especially since the creation of Yugoslavia in 
1918.116 
 Sriram, Martin-Ortega, and Herman provide the history of the formation of 
Yugoslavia early last century with the coming together of the Serb, Croats and 
Slovenes. 117  Kreimer builds on their contribution by researching deeper, even 
before Yugoslavia was founded in the 19th century. 118  Kreimer discusses the 
comprehensive historical developments in Bosnia to the present age.  Other 
scholars such as Jutze also provide a dialogue of the ancient history of 
Yugoslavia, going as back as the 14th and 15th century. 119  
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Laura and Little,120 Andersen and Lindesnes121 contribute to the history of Bosnia 
in the early 1990s in the lead up to the 92-95 war. They also introduce the 
international community perspective, demonstrating how their involvement 
accelerated the secession of some entities from Yugoslavia. Nation122 and 
Andersen and Wiberg 123 explore the methods through which the international 
community intervened to end the conflict in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Accord. His arguments are supported by the Cecik paper titled Post-
Conflict Reconstruction in Divided Societies: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which provide a detailed account of the process the international 
community went through before the warring parties could be brought to the 
negotiating table to end the war.124 Juncos discusses the Dayton Peace Accords, 
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highlighting the various effects of its implementation to the governance of 
Bosnia.125   
After researching the course of this conflict, the thesis shifts focus to the role of 
the international community in stabilizing the country and more specifically the 
contribution it has made towards reforming the defence organisation. King, Don 
and Hodes discuss detail about the resources that have been committed by the 
international community with the sole objective of reforming the defence forces of 
Bosnia. 126  Papenkort goes further and proposes a review of the global dynamics 
in the quest of understanding the security challenges that Bosnia face. 127  These 
include regional challenges such as porous borders and environmental 
degradation and global challenges such as international crime and terrorism. 
Aybet explains the regional challenges, citing the geo-strategic position of the 
whole Balkan region which can be used to traffic drugs, arms and humans. 128  
Within Chapter Three, the thesis will study the Dayton Peace Accords, 
recognizing it as a fundamental document that has shaped Bosnia to what it is 
today. Frank and Richmond discuss the details of the agreement; how it 
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determined the sharing of resources in the country, the governance structures 
and the composition of the defence forces. 129  They also look at the weaknesses 
of the Accords, which are explained in a 1997 report by NATO titled the NATO’s 
Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia. Another report titled Country 
Report Bosnia and Herzegovina discusses the Dayton Peace Accords, pointing 
out some of its structural limitations. 130  
Chapter Three will also explore the structure of the Bosnian government. This is 
in recognition of the fact that the structure and composition of the government is 
crucial in promoting the defence reforms and also align them to the security 
needs of the country. Without a robust governance structure the reforms in the 
defence sector cannot be considered a priority by any country. The 2009 report 
titled Country Assistance for Bosnia and Herzegovina criticizes the role of the 
political parties in Bosnia, which the report claims is undermining both democracy 
and reforms in the defence forces. 131  
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Rajchelet et al. provides the background of the formation of the Bosnian 
government by exploring the Dayton Peace Accords and its provisions, which are 
the foundation of the Bosnian government. 132  Beiber on the other hand 
comprehensively highlights the composition of the various arms of the Bosnian 
government namely the presidency, the Council of Ministers and the 
parliament.133  He looks at the relationship between these arms of the 
government and also gives highlights on how ethnicity impacts the composition 
of the government. Zupevic and Causevic discuss democracy in Bosnia, focusing 
on the various political parties in the country. 134   
The role the international community is analysed as it strives to ensure that 
Bosnia remains a stable state. With the delicate nature of the situation in Bosnia, 
halting the bloodshed was not all the international community could do; they had 
to come up with ways to ensure that peace prevailed. Beiber observes that the 
success of the Accords is attributable to the mandate that it gave the 
international community through various organizations to implement the 
provisions of the agreements.135 He offers examples of such organizations 
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including European Union Force (EUFOR); International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR). 
 Laurance and Meek136 and Aybet 137 and King et al., 138 look at the strategies 
that the international community has worked to strengthen the defence force of 
Bosnia by encouraging gradual reforms that bring the two entities together in a 
bid to dissolve the animosity. These strategies are also reflected in the report 
titled Country Assistance for Bosnia and Herzegovina139. Michael and Cooper 
state that the international community uses a two pronged strategy of either 
coaxing or coercion to have the entity armies take up training programs that bring 
them together. 140 In that case the invitation to join international organizations 
such as NATO is sufficient incentive to motivate its entity army to join inter-ethnic 
military programs. Zupcevic and Causevic,141 Traynor142 and Staples, look at the 
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various procedures that NATO has put in place in order to accommodate Bosnia 
in international organization structures. Morfew143 and Filipov144 discuss the role 
of the international actors in Bosnia and more specifically the Non-Governmental 
Organisations.   
An Overview of the Literature on the Creation of Segregated Forces in 
Bosnia   
In Chapter Four the thesis critically explores the actions that led to the formation 
of the segregated Defence Forces in Bosnia. There are three inter-related 
causes that can be attributed to this phenomenon. These include the negative 
legacy of the former Yugoslavia governing structures; the subsequent nationalist 
competition within Bosnia-Herzegovina and the provisions of the Dayton Peace 
Accords, which were later enshrined in the constitution of the country. 
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Shrader; Burg and Shoup,  Guab and Gow provide the insight into the 
developments in the former Yugoslavia which have later gone on to shape the 
manner in which the defence forces are currently being governed in Bosnia. 
Shrader highlights the rich multi-ethnic society that existed before the breakdown 
of Yugoslavia.145  Gow highlights the extent to which Bosnia was diverse with no 
majority religious community or any majority national group. 146 This background 
analysis is crucial in understanding the subsequent disharmony that rocked the 
countries such as Bosnia, which had seceded from Yugoslavia. 
Burg and Shoup discuss the relationship between the nationalist forces in 
Bosnia, 147 whereas Gaub provides an in-depth explanation of the structure and 
composition of the former Yugoslav army that helped to explain the nationalistic 
interests and the resulting segregation within the defence forces. 148 Shrader also 
links the nationalist competition to the on-going segregation within the army. 
Gaub on his part concurs with Shrader, proposing that the ethnic differences that 
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have brought about these divisions are better explored in the context of each 
entities self perception as a state. 149    
 Thirdly, critics have insisted that the Dayton Peace Accords itself has 
contributed to the segregation of the Defence Forces by forcibly keeping the 
ethnic factions apart from one another. The report by the Foreign Ministry of 
Norway titled A Bosnian Fortress: Return, Energy and the Future of Bosnia, 
highlights the various achievements that have been made through the 
implementation of the Accords over the years. These gains however, contradict a 
failure that the Accords have presided over, especially by entrenching 
segregation in the Defence Forces of Bosnia. 
The contribution by Gaub, Hadzovic, and Papenkort  further build on this point: 
Hadzovic and Papenkort state that the Dayton Peace Accords entrenched the 
ethnic divisions in the constitution of Bosnia, which later spilled over to other 
sectors of the Bosnian society, including the military. 150/151 Gaub on his part 
discuss how politicians took advantage of these legal divisions and stirred up 
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hatred amongst the citizens in their respective ethnic entities. 152 This 
encouraged each entity army to serve the interests of their ethnicity as a matter 
of priority.  
 
An Overview of the literature on the Impact of Segregated Forces in the 
Progress of Defence Reforms in Bosnia   
 
Through the insights of various literature, seven major ways through which this 
segregation impacts on the security in the country were identified. The first is 
disunity amongst the defence forces. On this point, Gaub provides the 
background insight on how the choice by each entity defence force to remain 
loyal to their ethnic agenda has alienated each from the other. 153 Hynes concurs 
with him, pointing out that these divisions contradict the interests of each entity 
army, which is to see a more stable and peaceful Bosnia. 154 
The other effects of the segregation are the absence of unity of command within 
the national defence force. Gaub blames this on the self-ethnic ambitions that 
each entity defence force has, which makes them unwilling to succumb to the 
interests of the nation at large.155 The territorial military leaders have a strong 
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hold on the entity armies. Hynes provides the details on the failure of the national 
military leadership to fully command and coordinate the defence activity of the 
army.  
Segregated defence forces have also made it difficult for the Bosnian national 
army to be considered for military campaigns on the international platform. The 
views of Papenkort, Hynes, alongside the report by the European Stability 
Initiative support  this point. 
The national defence force of the Bosnian army is a reflection of the political and 
social dynamics of the society at large. However, if the entity forces choose not 
to unite by those from other ethnic groups, this sends the message to the society 
at large that there is still tension and people need to remain wary. Therefore 
segregation causes tension between the populace and this doesn’t create an 
environment in which all the citizens can fully cooperate with the national security 
agendas.  Chalmer156 and Gaub157 explore how this tension pervades all the 
sections of Bosnian society and impacts on the pace of the defence reforms. 
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Due to these divisions in the defence forces the integrity of the Bosnian national 
army is in question and this had been a major hindrance to the country in joining 
international organizations such as NATO. Hynes discusses the Orao saga and 
how it revealed the underbelly of the defence force of Bosnia.158   
The lack of unity within the defence forces has also resulted in high costs of 
operations.  Papenkort discusses how Bosnia is coming to terms with these 
issues by taking measures such as reducing the number of personnel serving in 
the national defence force and ensuring that there are no unnecessary costs 
being incurred. He further identifies the loopholes that make the costs of 
operation to skyrocket and proposes solutions to this dilemma.159 
Finally, the divisions within the defence forces had heightened the lack of 
transparency within the national force as each entity harbours misgivings about 
the others. Tagarev explores the concept of transparency and particularly how it 
applies to the security sector.160  Tagarev also discusses ways in which 
transparency within the defence forces help to boost the mood of the general 
public in matters regarding security. His views are corroborated by Colston’s 
argument that defence issues need to be discussed by the all the stakeholders in 
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the society and should not just be left to the security actors. 161 This is hardly 
happening in Bosnia and this trend does not only make it improbable for the 
defence forces to come together; it makes the prospects of sustainable peace in 
Bosnia  unlikely, particularly if the process of the defence reforms were to be left 
in the hands of Bosnians.  
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Chapter 2 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
The theoretical framework is a conceptual model through which the researcher 
theorizes, makes analysis and draws conclusions on the numerous factors that 
have been identified as being crucial to the understanding and resolving the 
problem under study.162 The theoretical framework chosen in this study reflects 
the author’s attempt to seek an understanding of the phenomena at hand.  
Having gained first hand practical experience of the effects of ethnicity and ethnic 
tension in the Balkan region, first as a member of the NATO Stabilisation Force 
in Bosnia in 1998, then as a UN Military Liaison Officer in Kosovo in 2008, the 
author now seeks to understand the theory that drives ethnicity and the 
subsequent effect it has on the defence reform process underway in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Chapter Two will therefore explore the concepts that arise in the 
process of analyzing the progress of the defence reform in Bosnia with specific 
attention to the role of ethnicity within the armed forces. This chapter will explore 
the concept of negative ethnicity and democratic peace theory. These two 
concepts help inform the author’s analysis of Bosnia’s ethnic challenges and the 
progress of defence reform.   
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Negative Ethnicity 
The conflict that occurred in Bosnia in the mid 1990s was fought along ethnic 
lines. When the international community intervened and stopped the fighting with 
the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, it too focused on ethnicity to quell the 
violence.   An understanding of negative ethnicity is imperative to this study as it 
is useful in understanding the conflict in Bosnia and the ethnic divisions and 
tensions that exist within the armed forces.  Negative ethnicity occurs when one 
ethnic group believes they are superior to other ethnic groups. It has a direct 
influence on the pace and progression of the defence reform efforts.  Negative 
ethnicity not only played a key role in fueling the conflict, it has played a key role 
in the segregation of the armed forces in the years following the war and remains 
a key obstacle to the reform process.  Lastly and perhaps most importantly, 
understanding the concept of negative ethnicity is crucial in determining 
strategies that may offer long term solutions to overcome the ethnic divide that 
continues to hamper progress in the Balkans. 
By analysing negative ethnicity in this study, the author seeks an understanding 
of the motivations behind the ethnic conflict in Bosnia by looking at the theoretical 
underpinnings behind them.  Bosnia is an unusually complex country in a 
complicated situation and cannot move forward until it resolves the deep ethnic 
cleavages that exist within its society and its armed forces.  Understanding the 
complexities of ethnicity and ethnic conflict is therefore crucial not only to the 
progress of defence reform in Bosnia and its goal of NATO and EU integration 
but also to the international community who are increasingly becoming involved 
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in ethnic conflicts across the globe.  Therefore in the section that follows, the 
various models of ethnicity; the causes and courses of ethnic conflict will be 
explored in order to gain a comprehensive theoretical understanding of ethnicity 
as a concept and how it influenced the ethnic conflict in Bosnia and how it affects 
current defence reform efforts.   
There are various approaches that have been proposed by scholars, trying to 
explain the motivations that make it possible for people of a particular ethnic 
extraction to be rallied behind a cause that apparently represent their common 
interests. The thesis now explores those models, which are identified as the 
Primordial approach, the Instrumental approach and the Constructivist approach. 
A critical look will be taken of each approach, exploring the premise of each; their 
strengths and weaknesses. Not only is this critical analyses beneficial to the 
broader understanding of ethnic motivations, the analysis will also relate each 
approach to the Bosnian conflict in order to understand the effects of ethnicity on 
future defence reform efforts and to assist in the successful integration of the 
entity armed forces.    
The Primordial Approach 
The politicization and discrimination along ethnic background is a phenomenon 
that is hampering social, political and economic development in many multi-
ethnic democracies.  Primordialist thinkers consider why people from a particular 
ethnic block have the propensity of discriminating against people from other 
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ethnic backgrounds.163 One such thinker is Fearson who argues that ethnic 
groups are innately political, arguing that people who share biological roots, 
culture and a common history often consider these characteristics to be an 
unchangeable heritage of their social and political life.164 In this way they 
invariably become a political entity as they regard themselves as sharing a 
political destiny: disunity in this case would spell doom to their future political 
prospects. 
Yang supports Oberschall when he argues that ethnicity is an ascribed or 
assigned status that is handed down from a people’s ancestors.165 This means 
that you inherit both the physical and cultural characteristics of your forefathers. 
In this sense ethnicity is a deeply rooted primal bond that links one to his/her 
ancestors, hence kinsmen through their bloodline. In addition to the consequence 
of the attributed identity, the ethnic boundaries that are often used to put 
boundaries on who belongs to a certain ethnic community or not are normally 
fixed and also cannot easily be changed. 166  
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Therefore according to the primordial approach, ethnicity is a static phenomenon 
of culture in societies. If a person is born a Serb, he becomes a Serb forever and 
cannot change their ethnic membership to another group. In this way common 
ancestry determines a people’s ethnicity: people belong to a particular ethnic 
group simply because the members of that group share common biological and 
cultural origins. At this stage the primordial approach comes in by stressing the 
role of primordial factors such as identity and cultural ties in establishing a 
people’s identity. Therefore to the primordial thinkers it is the primordial bond that 
gives birth and also sustains ethnicity.167   
Fearson concludes that in the primordial model, the politicization of an ethnic 
group is the product of the assumption that polarization increases the bargaining 
power of an ethnic group and results in the acquisition of their preferences. 168 
Although this may work in the short term it does not explain the concept of ethnic 
mobilization and politicization in all instances. This is because the argument fails 
to answer the question of whether ethnic groups often disagree on the types of 
public goods that need to be provided.  
Fearson goes further to explain that in multi-ethnic states in the developing world, 
including African countries in particular, the access to schools, hospitals, roads 
and public service jobs are sought after by people from all ethnic backgrounds. 
The ethnic conflicts experienced in these countries have arisen when ethnic 
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coalitions are formed to gain a greater share of these public goods. In this case, 
ethnic blocks are in themselves incapable of accessing public goods by going it 
alone against other communities. They therefore band together with other ethnic 
communities to form a larger ethnic entity that can ensure their victory at the 
ballot box, hence access to the preferred public goods.169   
As will be illustrated in this thesis, some elements of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia can be attributed to such primordial sentiments.170  In spite of the 
apparent cooperation between the nationalities in Yugoslavia, there was still 
mistrust and hatred that prevailed amongst the ethnic entities. This trend set the 
stage for the growing uncertainty about pertinent issues such as state boundaries 
and the status of the minorities. It also brought about fierce competition for 
political power during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which culminated into 
ethnic cleansing as neighbours turned against each other and district against 
district in an ever expanding spiral of aggression and reprisal.  For the formation 
of another multi-ethnic country such as Bosnia-Herzegovina to have emerged 
from Yugoslavia, the ethnic communities within Bosnia had to unite and fight for 
their independence.  
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If the primordial approach was solely based on the primordial bond, then it 
invariably suffers some serious weaknesses especially when the case of the 
former Yugoslavia is taken into account. This is because there is no tangible 
evidence to support that there was long existing ethnic conflict between the 
ethnic blocks within Yugoslavia that necessitated the imminent break up. If 
anything, Yugoslavia had never witnessed the sort of religious wars that were 
recorded in Western and Central Europe earlier on. Besides, the Croats and 
Serbs were not involved in any conflict before the Twentieth Century and the 
contemporary ethnic conflict is more a function of deliberate divisive government 
policies than coming from traditional communal antagonism. Finally, this school 
of thought also fails to make sense of the variations in the politicization of ethnic 
groups that takes place time after time.171  Given the weaknesses of this 
approach, it is helpful to examine other possible theories to help frame this 
analysis.  
The Instrumentalist Approach 
This approach considers ethnicity as an instrument that is used by the political 
elite to advance their interests. Ethnic sentiments and loyalties are normally 
manipulated by political leaders and ethnic elite for political ends through the 
creation of ethnic nationalism. Fearson suggests that in many instances the 
social relevance of ethnicity arises when the people recognize and thereby align 
their actions to that of their ethnic distinctions in a particular situation or their 
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everyday life.172 Ethnicity is politicized when political allies or coalitions organize 
themselves along ethnic entities or rather when the access to political and/or 
economic gains is limited to ethnic backgrounds of a people. Notably, the extent 
to which ethnicity is politicized vary from one country to another over a given 
period of time.173   
When considering the conflict in the former Yugoslavia only a small number of 
politically significant actors in Bosnia were committed to a balance between civil 
society and nationalism.  None of the three nationalist parties in Bosnia were 
committed to the idea of civil society (although the Muslim party of Democratic 
Action (SDA) did support the idea of civil society in its party program in 
December 1992).  Each of the nationalist parties pursued goals that clashed with 
the other parties.  Of the three nationalist forces the Serbs come in for special 
mention; the Serbs as an ethnic nation had the goal of acquiring a greater Serbia 
in terms political power and pursued policies throughout the disintegration of 
Bosnia that provoked a great deal of anti-Serb sentiment in the West. Despite the 
ugliness of the Bosnian conflict, all three nationalist parties remain in power 
today.  This is a reflection of the ethnic tension and suspicion that remain rife 
across all sectors of Bosnian society and until resolved will continue to challenge 
reconciliation and ethnic integration within Bosnian society and indeed the 
Bosnia armed forces.    
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The Constructivist Approach 
The constructivist view serves to complement the insights that are offered by the 
primordial and instrumentalist views. According to the constructivist view, even 
though ethnicity and religion are real social factors, whatever matters most during 
ordinary times are their several roles and identities. Ethnic and religious issues 
are subject to manipulation by the political class with the aim of spreading fear 
and insecurity.174  
According to Gagnon, the constructivist view needs to be complemented with a 
model of ethnic polarization and conflict escalation and the accompanying failure 
of the resolution of such conflict. In an attempt to explain the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, this approach acknowledges the motivation behind the conflict was 
the incitement of the ethnic cleavages by the elite with the aim of creating a 
domestic political context in which ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity.  
In the ethnically mixed regions the people did not advocate for war; the violence 
was instigated from outside and took place along ethnic lines. However, the main 
cause was not ancient hatred but rather purposeful action by political actors who 
fanned and funded the violent conflict, selectively drawing on history when 
convenient so that they could portray it as historically inevitable. 175 
                                                             
174 Gagnon, V.P., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” International Security 19, no. 3 
(Winter 1994-1995): 132. 
175 Ibid, p.132. 
 72 
Gagnon further adds that the constructivist view is still incomplete despite the 
fact that it does offer quite useful insights: the top-down interpretation needs to 
be adjoined to the bottom-up interpretation, which is focused on uncertainty and 
fear driven by the security dilemma in ethnic conflicts. The breakdown of the 
state and its attendant anarchy often results from a lack of trust caused by the 
security dilemma in ethnic conflicts. The uncertainty over the intentions of other 
ethnic groups makes it necessary for entities to arm themselves for protection of 
lives and property. This ends up in ethnic mobilization taking the form of an arms 
race between states.176 In such cases, each ethnic entity no longer relies on the 
governing structures in place for protection and resorts to organised militia and 
fund raising within its populace to buy arms and prepare for war.  
In this case, ethnic hatred does not account for the outbreak of violence but 
rather fear and insecurity drive the ethnic groups to turn against each other. The 
defensive motivated actors provoke fear and countermeasures through their 
efforts to beef up their own security and this brings about less security than 
anticipated.177 
When considering all these views, which are providing the various causes of 
ethnic violence in context to the ethnic dilemma in Bosnia, it becomes apparent 
that intense conflict is in most instances caused by collective fears about the 
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future. Whenever ethnic entities fear for their safety, there inevitably emerges a 
strategic dilemma that is difficult and even dangerous to resolve because they 
contain in themselves the potential to result in adverse violence. The outbreak of 
conflict becomes even more likely when there are problems such as information 
failures which further translates into questionable credibility. In this situation, the 
ethnic entities are filled with dread and the state invariably becomes weak as 
ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs take advantage of these fears to 
polarize the society. These fears are magnified by political memories and 
grievances. Eventually, this evolves into mutual mistrust that could explode into 
bloody violence.178   
The viability of a state is invariably compromised by ethnic conflicts of this 
manner and more so in states that have feeble governance structures. The 
downside of this is that it often ends up in state failure and even anarchy (such 
as Somalia). When the ability of the state to provide security for its citizens 
becomes questionable this becomes a fertile ground for hostility and ethnic 
mistrust.179 
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Arguably, this is most likely to happen when societies undergo political transitions 
as was the case in Yugoslavia during the period 1986 to 1991 and also in Bosnia 
between 1991 and 1992: immediately the Yugoslav communist state had began 
disintegrating into constituent national parts, the people began asking 
themselves if the defence force from ethnic entities would protect them or if they 
will keep their job working under a boss who was not of their ethnicity. 180 
The weaknesses of the nation state and ethnic conflict therefore create a vicious 
circle. Evidently, ethnic conflict is prone to spreading even faster in a weaker 
state and in the same measure, the more intense the ethnic conflict the more 
endangered the state becomes. As polarization hold the members of an ethnic 
block are easily manipulated by their leaders to only identify with their ethnic 
group and break whatever binds them with other ethnicities. Indeed, the ethnic 
elites have the capacity of producing a rapid social polarization that magnifies 
hostility beyond proportion and instill fear amongst the populace. 181 
Stein believes that heightened political anxiety also alters the ethnic perceptions 
of each other resulting in increasing suspicion and intolerance.  This can persist 
even after a cease fire is reached. Besides, the affected state remains weak and 
the different ethnic groups remain distant from each other for some time. 
Therefore, the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach need to be 
combined in order for the weaknesses in the Bosnian defence organisation to be 
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adequately explained. These approaches have a bi-directional causality in the 
sense that ethnic leaders can stir up a receptive ethnicity just as Milosevic did 
and this can pressure other leaders to take radical measures to act as a 
counter.182 This results in the weakening of the common structure in favour of 
fragmentation. On the other hand, if ethnic conflicts are low for instance in 
countries in Western Europe, ethnicity as a factor cannot undermine the viability 
of the state and the chances of state failure are increasingly reduced.    
 
It has been stated that the construction of ethnicity is “grounded in the shared 
characteristics of social agents which shape and are shaped by the objective 
commonalities of practice otherwise referred to as the habitus.”183  These 
subliminal dispositions give the basis onto which the commonalities of sentiments 
and interest are recognized; they too offer the basis onto which cultural affinities 
and differences are perceived. As a result, the dichotomy between primordial and 
instrumental approaches to ethnicity can be transcended. The practices and 
experiences of a particular ethnic people are a reflection of their cultural practices 
and representation.184  
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Jones contends that ethnicity is neither structured nor directly congruent to the 
cultural practices and representation of a particular people. Ethnic identification 
largely involves the objectification of cultural practices in a bid to recognize and 
signify the difference of one community with another. The specifics of such 
objectification of cultural difference is explained by the intersection of the habitus 
with the prevailing conditions in particular circumstances. Due to this, “the extent 
to which ethnicity is entrenched in pre-existing cultural realities represented by a 
shared habitus is highly variable and contingent upon the cultural transformations 
engendered by the nature of interaction and the power relations between groups 
of people.” 185 
As a result of such contingency, Jones notes that the cultural practices and 
representations involved in the signification of the ‘same’ identity may vary 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively in different social contexts characterized by 
different social conditions. Thus, there is rarely a simple one to one relationship 
between representation of ethnicity and the range of cultural and social practices 
associated with a specific ethnic group.186  
In summary, the constructivist considers the primordialist approach as lacking in 
basis and thereby not consistent with reality. They base this argument on the 
overwhelming empirical evidence that ethnic conflict is in most cases caused by 
calculated economic and political actions of human societies. They also consider 
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ethnic identities as the creation by the elite for their own interests. Whereas they 
do agree with the primordial view on the mechanics of ethnic identity, particularly 
in terms of the use of the common identifiers. Therefore, to the constructivists, 
the rise of nationalist ethnic identities in the post-Cold War era has been the 
result of a common desire of peoples to use ethnicity as a tool for political 
power.187 
Ethnic Conflicts 
After looking at the possible motivations that drive people of particular ethnic 
groups to discriminate against or even fight people from rival ethnicities, the 
study will now look at the mechanisms of ethnic conflict.  By discussing the 
mechanisms of ethnic conflict it is possible to identify some of the main causes of 
ethnic violence and mitigate the risk of future violence through measures taken 
within the reforms of the government and defence organisations.  Ethnic 
differences are not limited to Bosnia alone and many states that experience 
ethnic difficulties of some form or another such as Canada, Belgium and France 
have developed measures to ensure that differences are resolved peacefully and 
not through violent means. In this section emphasis is placed on the realism and 
surrealism of ethnic conflicts; their causes, forms and structures. 
It can be argued that ethnic conflict is a term that in many instances is associated 
with legitimate negativity and it is thus muddled in confusion. It would perhaps be 
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futile to make the assumption that ethnic conflicts are normally brought about by 
ethnicity or rather negative ethnicity. This is because ethnicity is by no means the 
ultimate source of violence in the case where ethnic groups fight each other.188 
Ethnicity has been used as the fuel that has stoked conflicts that have been 
started by reasons other than ethnicity: this has been achieved by inciting 
people’s emotions and assuring them that by becoming involved in ethnic conflict 
they will not only be defending the interests of their kinsmen but they will reap the 
gains as individuals.   
The argument leaves us with the question – when do conflicts become ethnic 
conflicts? Chaim suggests that ethnic conflict normally occurs within states 
between ethnic groups. They are disputes between ethnic communities, which 
view themselves as bearing distinct heritages over the power relations in the 
society. Chaim further claims that there is generally a predictable process that 
underlies such conflicts, which involves the construction of symbolic boundaries 
and the accompanying generation of collective identity.189 With this in mind it 
then becomes safe to conclude that ethnicity is not necessarily the sole cause of 
ethnic conflict but rather the struggle over the power to control resources or 
dominate other communities in political, economic and/or cultural terms.   
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Scherrer appears to differ with both Chaim and Brubaker et al., by claiming that 
there are a myriad of factors that contribute towards the emergence of ethnic 
conflicts. These include the history of antagonisms shared between ethnic 
groups; a pattern of ethnic domination and/or inequality between ethnic groups 
and the tendency of regarding the contemporary inter-ethnic competition as a 
zero-sum game. Ethnic conflicts can also be a result of an electoral triumph or 
other such claims that bring nationalist forces to power and the inadequacy of the 
existing political structure that can help to moderate or constrain such behavior; 
the existence of competing, exclusivist claims to authority over a particular 
territory; a pattern of settlement that lends itself too easily to secession or 
partition and the existence of foreign donors of extremist politics. 190     
The essence of ethnic conflict is the struggle between the mobilized identity 
groups in pursuit of greater social, economic and/or political power. This struggle 
is either aimed at achieving equality within an existing state or establishing a fully 
independent national state. They offer the example of the collapse of 
communism which resulted in the disintegration of the remaining multinational 
states in Europe. This development was followed by the victory of liberal 
democracy and the legitimization of new civil states. In this set up the older 
historical identities such as religion, national identity and ethnicity came out as 
the foundation for political mobilization and the claim to statehood. The end result 
was the conflict between the territorial integrity and state sovereignty on one 
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hand and the power and violence of appeal to ethnicity as a basis of state 
formation on the other.191 
This is supported by Wolff who states that one part of the conflict will have to 
make claim of their ethnic identity as being the reason why its members either 
failed or emerged victorious192. He thus defines ethnic conflict as a form of group 
conflict in which at least one party that is involved in the conflict interprets the 
conflicts, its causes and potential solutions on the basis of the existing or 
perceived discrimination along ethnic lines. Ethnicity is therefore one common 
way through which people are often organized for collective action, an initiative 
that at times turned into a violent tactic. In summary, ethnic conflicts reflect a 
situation in which two or more parties are in pursuit of incompatible goals, 
according to their own points of view.  
In this way, ethnicity has become a sure blue print that is used to determine 
collective action whenever circumstances demand for it. Giesen, Schmidtke, and 
Tambini caution that whether attention will be given to ethnic mobilization, 
regionalist groups or xenophobic actions, they all develop from the specific 
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coding of collective identity. 193   They too are in agreement with Scherrer by 
attributing the emergence of ethnic conflict to factors such as language, mobility, 
class system, territoriality, unequal citizenship and the backing by foreign states 
as was the case in the former Yugoslavia.  
Democratic Peace Theory 
There is general consensus in the literature available on the theory of liberal 
peace194 that democratic states do not go to war with each other and that they 
are more prone to peaceful behaviour than non democratic states.  It is also 
suggested that democratic states share the same norms and values and as a 
result enjoy the efficiency of inter-democratic bargaining and conflict resolution. 
This thesis contends that the elements of democratic peace theory should form 
the backbone of the democratic reforms underway in Bosnia and emphasize the 
importance of stable democratic governance in enhancing defence reform.  In 
their paper titled Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Herd and Tracy point out that “the accountability and transparency within 
democratic states, particularly in their oversight of the military, reduces corruption 
in the defence sector and increases the legitimacy and the efficiency of the 
military.” 195  Democratic peace underpins the reform of Bosnian society and in 
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the section that follows the theory of democratic peace will be defined and 
analyzed as it applies to the state of Bosnia and its influence on ethnicity and the 
progress of defence reform.  
 
In defining Democratic Peace Theory, Clemens first identifies peace as a 
requirement that enables social, political and economic reform take place in any 
country. 196  Further, he points out that both peace and development thrive on 
self-organization. Clemens borrows his concept of democratic peace from 
Immanuel Kant who argues that the key to peace was republicanism or rather 
representative governance but not monarchy or even direct democracy. The 
republican government could be in the form of an oligarchy, consisting of a few of 
the elite or it can be democratic – involving many people in governance. 
Whichever form it may take, the republican government is synergetic in the 
sense that it does not only contribute but also gains from the international 
organization and law; the spirit of trade and the culture of mutual respect.  
 
Democratic states are considered more likely to respect and treat with dignity 
citizens within their territory including those belonging to minority groups.  They 
are more likely to seek peaceful resolution to potential conflicts and seek 
peaceful and constructive relations with neighbouring states.  A democratic 
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framework guarantees public involvement in state affairs and provides the 
mechanism to address issues that are normal within all states.  Effective 
democratic institutions can also prevent nationalists from mobilising the 
population along ethnic lines however if effective democratic mechanisms are 
absent, the likelihood of ethnic violence increases along with the risk of being 
unable to contain the violence and being unable to resolve the conflict.197 
 
Clemens agrees with this sentiment and agrees that the people who perceive 
each other as sharing democratic values will hardly fight one another. 198 In fact, 
the twentieth century has seen democracies coming together and prevailing 
against dictators. Clemens notes that Kant advocated for self-organization, since 
the societies that are based on self-rule are normally geared towards mutual 
gain. This aspect of governance is lacking in the leadership structures of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Ever since the mid 1990s conflict, the country has hardly stood on 
its own feet, given the heavy presence of the international community that 
ensures that its systems are working. In essence, the democracy of Bosnia is 
largely a pretense, its civil society cannot salvage the situation as it is too 
steeped in the ethnic divide; not to mention the lack of political will by the political 
elite who are somewhat content to promote the status quo.     
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Fischer agrees that peace is mostly attributed to the democratic character of a 
state and the norms as was earlier on proposed by Kant. Fischer comments that 
in many instances policy makers often advocate for democracy for the sake of 
peace, rather than liberalism. He however terms this ‘conflation’ as insignificant 
because both the theorists and the practitioners invariably make reference to the 
liberal kind of democracy that currently prevails in the Western democracies. In 
spite of that, it is important to appreciate the significant differences that exist 
between the democratic and the liberal aspect of these regimes in order to grasp 
the peace that prevails among them.199 
 
In simpler terms democracy lays out a prescription of the rule of the people: 
every member of an entity is given equal opportunity to decide their form and 
substance of their governance. In the direct democracies of past, these decisions 
were a preserve of assemblies in which every citizen had one vote. But in the 
representative democracy of modern times, the citizens have the democratic 
responsibility of periodically electing public officials. Accordingly, democratic 
institutions promote equal capacity for every citizen to determine their 
government through the means of open, fair and competitive elections at all 
levels of governance. The democratic institutions also promote equal capacity 
through the concentration of the supreme authority in the people and its 
representatives; through referendum that give the people a chance to directly 
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decide important issues. The institutions also widen taxation and welfare policies 
that promote equality and devise measures that are geared towards enhancing 
the responsiveness of the representatives to the electorate by for instance, 
shortening their terms of office and reducing the numbers of voters in their 
electoral districts.200  
 
Democracy strives towards freeing the individual from oppression, especially 
from the oppressive rules and the legal structures in place. 201 Democracy 
achieves this by enshrining this freedom in a number of rights that must be 
observed under almost all circumstances. These rights include the right to life 
and/or immunity from violence; the right to express oneself; the right to free 
movement; the right to assemble freely; the right to abode, to acquire and to 
dispose of property; the right profess and practice one’s faith and even to engage 
in arts and commerce of one’s choice.  
 
Fischer suggests that in order to ensure that these rights are guaranteed to 
citizens the liberal institutions should employ a number of strategies. This 
includes the advocating for a constitution that lays out the basic rights of the 
citizens and limits the power of the government by spreading power in all the 
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three arms of governance. 202  They also guarantee these rights by insisting on 
the strict adherence to the rule of law, the separation of the state and the church, 
the protection of private property; an open competitive market through the free 
exchange of goods and services and the minimum regulations on taxation. This 
has resulted into the laissez faire attitude that has led to the developments of a 
free market society in which individuals compete for goods that satisfy their 
desires whereas the government provides the much needed security and 
procedural justice.  
 
These two features of governance have been combined in what has come to be 
known as liberal democracy in the western modernity. This combination is 
agreeable given that a democracy must at least give its citizens the freedom to 
vote in order for it to function as the rule of the people. It may also allow its 
citizens to form parties that can compete for votes, or voice their political 
opinions. On the other hand, democracy acknowledges these liberties such as 
the right to vote, the right to assemble, the right to practice free speech and the 
right to associate. In summary, the liberal principle of equality before the law is in 
concert with the democratic quest for equality, so long as democracy does not 
lead to the leveling of all social and economic conditions.203   
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So far, the international community has all along recognised the importance of 
democracy in Bosnia. Immediately after the Dayton Accords was signed the 
international community began initiating development projects in Bosnia with the 
aim of recovering the economy. 204 But shortly after, the focus expanded to 
include reforms in the political structures and the society at large. The European 
Union played a major role in this regard: it created a new developmental program 
in 2000 which in essence encompassed the whole Balkan region. The program 
was called Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilizing (CARDS) and focused on democratic stabilization, reconstruction, 
reconciliation and the return of the refugees. It also involved in institutional and 
legislative developments such harmonizing the European Union norms, human 
rights, and the rule of law, the civil society and the media. In summary, this 
program was generally aimed at promoting sustainable social-economic 
developments, including structural reforms and regional co-operation.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed various theoretical issues that arise in the quest to 
analyse the progress of the defence reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the role 
of ethnicity within the armed forces. For the reform of the defence forces of 
Bosnia to be considered as progressive, the ethnic question within the ranks and 
files of the military needs to be adequately addressed. In this chapter the thesis 
identified that negative ethnicity played a key role in the recent conflict in Bosnia 
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that claimed lives and decimated the states infrastructure.  Therefore, in the 
quest to understand the ethnic question in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study 
explored the concept of ethnicity and its various forms of definition. Also 
discussed were the various models of ethnicity. Here, there are three possible 
approaches that can be used to explain the phenomenon in which the people 
from a particular ethnic group are easily rallied behind a cause that is intended to 
protect their interests.  This at times includes taking up arms against other 
ethnicities. These approaches include the primordial, modernist, instrumental and 
constructivist approach. While considering the Bosnian example, the analysis 
contends that none of these approaches on its own can adequately explain the 
conflict in Bosnia. However when examined in context, all approaches are helpful 
in providing a framework to more clearly interpret the conflict in Bosnia and assist 
in the mitigation of future ethnic conflict. 
 
Also addressed in this chapter was the theory of democratic peace. The chapter 
looked at how liberalism is closely linked to democratic tenets; that while 
democracy offers the citizens the opportunity to choose their own political path, 
democracy ensures that the rights and freedoms guaranteed in a democracy are 
enforced. The study of this theory helped to bring to light the inadequacies in the 
governance of Bosnia. The democratic structures set in place by the Dayton 
Peace Accords have not provided the citizens the most that a democracy can 
deliver in terms of service delivery. The civil society that in most democracies 
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ensures the provision of democracy, is not effective in its efforts to ensure that 
the rights of each citizen in Bosnia are upheld.     
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Chapter 3 – BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE 
PROGRESS OF DEFENCE REFORM   
Introduction 
Chapter three will not only focus on the conflict that took place in Bosnia-
Herzegovina during the mid 1990’s, it goes further to consider the situation in 
Bosnia today.  This is important despite the fact that there is no open conflict 
currently occurring in Bosnia, the ethnic communities and political parties remain 
antagonistic and are far from harmonious. This chapter shall therefore discuss 
the structure of governance in Bosnia and explore how it works for or against the 
defence reform process. The contribution of the international community in 
Bosnia before, during and after the 1992-1995 war will also be discussed. The 
history of the progress of defence reform is inextricably bound to the history of 
conflict in the country. In other words, in this chapter the history of progress in the 
defence reform process; the gains made and the failures incurred will be 
highlighted. 
 
After exploring the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, an indication of what transpired and 
some explanation can be offered. However, for the sake of avoiding duplicity the 
study moves beyond ethnicity as the historical background to the conflict is 
examined. To better comprehend the form and substance of the conflict in 
Bosnia it is imperative that the history of the war and more so the history of its 
mother country, Yugoslavia be analysed. On the other hand, the causes of 
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Yugoslavia’s dissolution are easily identified by exploring the country’s historical 
roots and by studying the more current geopolitical developments. However, 
even without making too much of the historical background of Yugoslavia the 
critical question that remains unanswered is whether the country was ever a 
cohesive state ever since its formation in 1918? Answering this question may 
perhaps shed light on the reasons that led to Yugoslavia’s dissolution. 
 
It is important to remember that Yugoslavia was a product of the unification of the 
Kingdom of Serb, Slovenes and Croats in 1918. This unified country became 
known as Yugoslavia in 1929.  Even though the various ethnic groups lived 
across this territory and even inter-married, the Serbs were the majority and 
resided in what is now known as Serbia; the Croats lived in Croatia whereas the 
Slovenes resided in Slovenia. Therefore, what is currently known as Bosnia was 
a multi-ethnic nation but with the Bosnian Muslim majority.205 
 
As discussed earlier, the history of South Yugoslavia was free from ethnic 
violence until the time when Croats and Serb nationalism emerged in the 19th 
century. The distinction between the Croats and the Serbs dates back to the 7th 
century with the arrival of two small groups that quickly assimilated into the 
Slaveni majority and then gave their names to the Slaveni that lived in different 
areas. At that time the South Slav were situated between the Roman Catholicism 
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and the Byzantine and Hapsburg and the Ottoman empires. As time went by they 
became easily differentiated by religion even though they still shared cultural 
traits such as a similar language.206  
 
During this period there were three recognized religions within Bosnia: the Croats 
and the lesser minorities such as the Hungarian Slovaks, Germans and 
Romanians were Catholics; the Bosnians, Turks and Albanians were Muslims 
and the Serbs and Montenegrins were Greek Orthodox. Notably, many who had 
been conquered by the Turks had adopted the Turkish religion in order to avoid 
annihilation. Under Tito’s leadership, all the ethnic and religious groups were 
nominally equal and in practice, all ethnic and religious affiliations were 
discouraged and a new identity of the atheist Yugoslav was fostered.207 
 
All the republics within Bosnia were multi-cultural and the high rates of inter-
marriages demonstrated that both the religious and ethnic boundaries were 
highly permeable. However, the Catholic Croats, Muslims, the Orthodox Serbs 
and Slovenes consisted of the majority even though they lived in different areas 
and there were seasons of migrations of populations and conversions from one 
religion to another. As a result all the areas that accommodated the majorities 
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inevitably contained significant majorities, including the Hungarians and the 
Albanians.208 
 
Jutze argues that considering the many jurisdictions in the Yugoslav region. 
Bosnia boasts the longest history as a geographically continuous entity whose 
independence statehood begun in the 14th and 15th century. 209 But he notes that 
it was in the 19th century, especially with the takeover of Bosnia by Austria in 
1878 that the notion that the Orthodox that lived in Bosnia was Serb and the 
Catholics were Croats began to gain currency. Given the protracted history of 
migrations, conversions and intermarriages, the ethnic identities that were newly 
introduced were seldom based on genealogy; thus no Bosnian of any leaning 
had previously deemed themselves as being either Croat or Serb. 
 
In its desire to create a model colony, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had 
committed considerable resources in terms of time, money and energy striving to 
modernize Bosnia by developing public buildings, new schools and infrastructure. 
Jutze notes that with the developments in modern invention, the concept of 
nationalism also emerged.210 Nationalism soon became the most debated issue 
of the day with the Serbs advocating for it largely due to the fact that they 
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intended to come up with a greater Slavic state under their leadership. This idea 
was rebuffed by other Bosnians who favored a pluralistic, multi-ethnic society; an 
agenda that was derived by the fear that they would have no place in a state that 
would be dominated by the Serbs. 
 
The primary motive of the Bosnian conflict was hostility towards those 
populations that seemed to have been culturally superior to the others (negative 
ethnicity). 211  In essence the conflict was a mechanism inspired by the need of 
some to want to bring down the system of ethnic co-existence that had been 
imposed in the era of Marshal Tito. As mentioned earlier, there was a formal 
recognition of the existing ethnic and religious disparities in Yugoslavia during the 
Tito regime and they became arranged in a new way. In summary there were six 
republics, which included Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia that 
incorporated what had previously been Vojvodina and Kosovo. Cutting across 
these were other five South Slav nations that were granted political status; they 
included Slovenes, Macedonia, Croats, Serbs and Muslims. The Muslims were 
considered not as a religion but as a single ethnic community. 
 
Geopolitical dynamics also played a role in shaping the Bosnian conflict. With the 
creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia following the First World War, the Balkan 
lines were redrawn.212 Initially termed as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
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Slovenes, the newly founded Kingdom of Yugoslavia consisted also of the South 
Slav, for the first time bringing all these populations into one independent state. 
What ensued was the inter-war politics within the Kingdom that were 
characterized by turbulence with the dominating Croat and Serb parties failing to 
attain a stable modus operandi. The parties were eventually unable to overcome 
the tensions brought about by the distrust between them, which became a 
product of nationalistic rivalry.  
 
Geopolitical dynamics have also influenced the Bosnian conflict up to the current 
date.  The Second World War greatly impacted the social and political situation in 
Bosnia.213 An example was the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis in 1941 which 
provided the Ustashe with the freedom to create a separate Croatian state. Once 
in power the Ustashe entrenched the policy of mass imprisonment and slaughter 
of the minorities within the state, targeting mainly Gypsies, Jews and Serbs. 
 
On the other hand, as Singer points out, the greater Slavic state was dominated 
by the Serb, something that eventually brought about much resentment amongst 
other communities and this situation became worse during the occupation by 
German forces. 214  Sriram et al.,notes that the German forces faced stiff 
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resistance from paramilitary groups but were also helped by the Croatian 
Ustashe, being the Croatian ultranationalist organization that perpetrated the 
ethnic cleansing and expulsion of the Gypsies, Serbs and Muslims.215 With the 
end of the Second World War and the withdrawal of the German Army, 
Yugoslavia became united under Tito and his communist government.  This unity 
endured beyond his death in 1980 and his communist rule endured by 
authoritarian rule rather than by the support of the Soviet Union.  
 
With the subsequent demise of communism, the people of Bosnia began to recall 
the conflicts of the past. Besides aided by the fact that Yugoslavia was in fact an 
artificial entity, resulted in the breakup of the country and the reappearance of the 
pre-war ethnic awareness. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic became president of the 
Serbian republic within Yugoslavia and immediately set out to promote Serb 
domination. This move sparked a separatism which culminated into the violent 
breakup of the state along ethnic lines.216  
 
As much as geopolitical dynamics played a hand in determining the course of the 
conflict so did the actors in the international community, overtly and/or covertly 
influencing its outcome.   Prior to the 1990s conflict, the EU had attempted to 
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provide solutions to a number of problems that faced Yugoslavia in a bid to help 
the country remain unified. 217 These efforts continued until 1991 when 
communism disintegrated and it became clear that the West had failed to unite 
the ethnic populations within Yugoslavia. The EU in fact began to recognise 
individual republics that were seceding and declaring their independence. 
Germany were first to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent states in 
late 1991.    
 
The EU gave recognition to the declaration of independence of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in April 1992. This took place against a backdrop of incessant 
warnings that kept streaming in from experts in security policy and the Serb 
politicians in Bosnia who flagrantly declared that they would resort to armed force 
to oppose living in the state of Bosnia.218 
 
As Yugoslavia began fragmenting into small new states, other challenges began 
to emerge with the creation these new entities. It is due to these developments 
that the recognition policy had a decisive effect in tipping the fragile political and 
ethnic balance in Yugoslavia.219  The importance of this was that the ex-
Yugoslavia would be dominated by the Serbs, especially after the exit of Slovenia 
and Croatia, this therefore made those populations that were not Serb to feel 
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vulnerable. This was especially true for the Muslims and Bosnian Croats who 
were now confronted with the choice of seeking the recognition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina or remaining in a Yugoslavia that was dominated by Serbs.  
 
The recognition of these independent states brought about boundary conflicts.  At 
the outset, there was no certainty that the boundaries of the existing Yugoslavia 
would remain as the boundaries of the new self-declared independent states. 
The drawing of boundaries left a larger Albanian minority in Serbia or Kosovo 
and the larger Serb minorities in Croatia. The revision of the borders was bound 
to create a precarious precedent in the Eastern Europe region, resulting in new 
territorial and ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the EU had little choice but to recognize 
the republican boundaries in order to avoid such ethnic and territorial conflicts. In 
Bosnia the creation of these boundaries would have been a delicate balancing 
act. The drawing of boundaries between the ethnic groups was not possible in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was composed of an ethnic patchwork including 
the Croatian, Muslim and Serbian populations that were mixed with each other 
alongside many other minorities220.  
What followed the creation of Bosnia was the bloody civil war that began in 1992 
and ended in 1995, resulting in at least 100,000 deaths and 2.2 million people 
displaced. 221  The war in Bosnia became Europe’s most devastating conflict 
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since World War Two. Through the efforts of the international community, the 
Dayton Peace Accords was brokered in 1995 halting the bloodshed and 
providing the framework of governance in Bosnian and Herzegovina. Even 
though the Accords have been criticized for entrenching ethnicity by recognizing 
the two ethnic entities, the Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation; 
an arrangement that has reinforced separatism rather than integration, it has 
however helped in a significant way to reform the defence system of Bosnia.222 
The Dayton Peace Accord will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.  
 
The Governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina   
The governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina will now be analysed because 
without genuine commitment and political will, the reform of the defence forces in 
Bosnia cannot succeed.  The constitution that currently governs Bosnia was 
adopted from the Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords. The provisions of this 
Accord make Bosnia a federal democratic republic made up of two First Order 
administrative divisions. The two divisions consist of the Bosnia under the 
leadership of the Serb, which is otherwise referred to as the Republika Srpska. 
The other division consists of the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia that is also 
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known as Federation Bosnia Herzegovina and Brćko district, this is the first 
internationally supervised district. 223 
 
The Bosnian government can be defined as a semi-presidential system in which 
there are three presidents instead of one. Bieber points out that this presidential 
system of governance is not common and more so amongst multinational 
states.224  Arguably, the presidential system is not conducive to the governance 
of societies that are divided. The conventional presidential or semi-presidential 
systems reduce the effectiveness of grand coalitions, whose salient feature is 
power sharing arrangements, as considerable executive power is concentrated in 
one hand. This ability, as was the case under Tito in Yugoslavia is limited in the 
Bosnian case, largely because its society is highly polarized and there also very 
few political players who can cut across the ethnic divide and actually gain 
support. The main drawback with this presidential system in such divided 
societies is the limitations it puts on coalition building, since the members of the 
presidential system are elected directly.   
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Beiber claims that the system of multi-member presidency is a distinct heritage 
from the former Yugoslavia.225  According to the constitution of Yugoslavia in 
1974, there was a provision for eight presidents who were all equally 
representing six republics and two autonomous provinces, with a multi-member 
presidency. Between 1990 and 1996 the Yugoslavia presidency had seven 
members with two coming from each of the three nations and one for the 
minorities. Similarly, the Dayton Peace Accords provides for three presidents: 
one Bosniak, one Serb and one Croat. Additionally, the agreement incorporates 
an element of territoriality by requiring that the Serb President should be elected 
in the RS, whereas the Bosniak and the Croat members should be elected in the 
Federation.  
 
The presidency of Bosnia is made up of representatives from each nation and 
two from one and one from the other entity. In this arrangement the twin 
definitions of membership means that other minorities, the non-ethnically 
identified citizens and the non-dominant national communities such as the Serbs 
in the Federation and, the Bosniak and Croats in the RS, are all precluded from 
being elected to the presidency. In the past most presidents acted on the behalf 
of their ethnic entities, thereby denying the above mentioned groups the 
opportunity to either run for the presidency and/or being represented by it. 226 
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This arrangement also reveals a key feature of the system of power sharing in 
Bosnia, which is that all the national representations autonomy is territorial. This 
means that even if a particular position or prerogative is defined in national term, 
it ends up being supplemented with territorial dimensions. As a result, non-
territorial or cultural autonomy is not party to the present system of power sharing 
in Bosnia. This development is unacceptable taking into account the tradition of 
non-territorial autonomy, for example the Millet system in the Ottoman Empire 
that had granted religious independence to communities in the empire. Similar 
trends were also reported in the succeeding Austro-Hungary rule. 227 
The presidency of Bosnia is chaired in annual rotation by one of the three 
members. 228  However, the chairmanship of the presidency does not come with 
additional powers. The primary role of the presidency include conducting foreign 
policy, which is one of the key powers vested in that joint institution. The fact that 
all the entities are entitled to special relations with their neighbouring states has 
further undermined the foreign policy leverage institution, especially towards 
Croatia and Serbia. Far from that, each President that has taken up the 
chairmanship has represented Bosnia differently, according to their national 
background.  This has led to the weakening of the foreign policy. Generally, the 
presidency has been a weak institution particularly due to the lack of cooperation 
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amongst its members. Despite failing to manage foreign policy of the country, the 
institution has been incompetent in acting as an arbiter in domestic politics, 
especially between entities.  
When it comes to the legislature of the country, Bosnia has a two chamber 
parliamentary system at the state level, which reflects a federal arrangement and 
also the necessity of granting representation to both the three nations and the 
two entities. 229 The House of People is made up of 15 members and gives equal 
representation to all the three national groups. It however requires that the 
members should be elected from the entities where they constitute the dominant 
groups in the country, which are the Bosniak and Croats from the Federation and 
the Serb from the Republika Srpska. As opposed to being elected, the members 
of this chamber of parliament are rather chosen by the respective entity 
parliaments.   
The House of Representative is composed of 42 members who are elected from 
the two entities. Two thirds of the seats in this house are reserved for the 
Federation, whereas one third of the seats go to the RS. The non-dominant 
groups within Bosnia are still under represented even though this arrangement 
favours their representation.  For example, out of the 28 deputies that were 
elected from the Federation in 2000, about 20 of them were Bosniak candidates, 
while six were Croats and two were Serbs. This trend also plays out in the RS 
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where more representatives have excluded non-dominant groups from both 
entities. 230 
The check and balance system within the parliament has been ensured by the 
quorum and veto systems that have prevented the assembly from taking any 
decisions that conflict with the will of any of the three national ethnic entities that 
are represented in the parliament. It is required that at least a third from each 
entity supports a legislation or decisions before it can be passed in the 
parliament. Whenever these numbers are not raised, the Chair of the Chamber 
and his deputies who come from the three entities has the responsibility of 
securing such a majority.  Apart from the veto and the quorum system, any of the 
three community caucuses can object to a law or decision if it threatens the vital 
interests of their community.231  
The executive arm of the Bosnian government is also made up of the Council of 
Ministers. The chairperson of the council, who in essence becomes the de facto 
Premier is nominated by the presidency but has to be approved by the House of 
Representatives.  This council is weak in comparison to the parliament as it is 
enshrined in an article under the presidency in the constitution but not separately 
as it is the case with the legislature. The constitution only provides for two 
Ministers of the joint institutions, who work under the foreign trade and the 
foreign ministry. Any other Ministers are created with the approval of the House 
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of Representatives. Besides, the territorial distribution of Ministers has also been 
addressed in the constitution, clearly pointing out that no more than two thirds of 
the Ministers can come from the Federation. 232 
Until 2002, every Ministry had two deputy Ministers: these Ministers had two 
deputies who came from the other nations. As a legal requirement both the 
Ministerial position alongside that of their deputy are normally distributed on party 
basis. Previously, the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers rotated amongst 
the various ministries. This system was however replaced by a permanent 
chairperson and this has helped to do away with the conventional cabinet 
system.  Nonetheless, the government will be strengthened to effectively 
discharge its duties the hurdle remains the creation of elaborate power-sharing 
mechanisms and the strength of each entity.233  
What therefore are some of the drawbacks of this governance system and how 
do they affect reforms in the defence forces?  Rajchel et al, argues that the 
Dayton Peace Accords made Bosnia a multi-national state and also the home of 
three ethnic groups that are otherwise referred to as the constituent people of the 
country. 234 The largest group amongst these constituent people is the 
Bosniaks235, followed by the Bosniak Serbs and the Bosniak Croatians. These 
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ethnic structures of the government in Bosnia alongside the continuous presence 
of the international community question the sustainability of the status quo in the 
country; it also questions the ability of the Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks to 
effectively and independently run their country.  Being a creation of external 
powers and its dependence on those external powers to sustain it, the political 
system within Bosnia make it difficult to adequately influence positive 
developments in the defence organization without international assistance. 
Zupcevic and Causevic add that the political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have over time showcased their resilience to externalities. This has ensured that 
the current strongest political parties are the same ones that have ruled over the 
political scene ever since the late 1980s. Examples of these are the Croatian 
Democratic Community (HZD), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the 
Bosniak Party for Democratic Action. These parties have survived the war and 
are presently stronger than ever. Parties such as SDA have joined forces with 
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) in advocating for a united state. The 
SBiH, SDA and HZD are the dominating parties in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.236 It should be noted that without political will, the reformation of 
the defence forces cannot be achieved in Bosnia. In fact, the slow pace of this 
progress is hampered ethno-political alignments that are impeding healing the 
Bosnian society. It is therefore unbecoming for the political class in the country to 
                                                             
236 , Domestic Political Structures and their Impact on Peacebuilding, p.7. 
 
 107 
continue to pledge their allegiances to their ethnic interests as this does not bode 
well for the ongoing defence reforms in the country.  
 
The lack of political will amongst the political players is best demonstrated by 
Zupcevic, Causevic’s example of the SDS party that arrived on the political stage 
as a progressive and liberal party that has eventually turned into the strongest 
advocate of anti-unitary government. It rather pushes for ethnic separation in 
institutions, both public and private and also advocates for the dismemberment of 
the country along ethnic lines. Unfortunately, this school of thought is prompted 
by some provisions in the Dayton Accord: the leadership’s invocation of the 
Accord, for instance, helped to secure the ethnic quota. This means that the 
predominant Serb entity, which incidentally has vast competencies, is regarded 
as a chief impediment to a more pronounced stabilization.237  This point is better 
illustrated in the 2009 report titled Country Assistance Strategy for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina who explains the opposing views of the Bosniak, Serb and Croat 
political parties.  The Bosnian Serbs insist on a decentralised, federal structure 
and have been known to block initiatives to strengthen the capacity of the central 
Bosnian state.  The Bosniak leaders have also stirred up Nationalism by referring 
to the Republika Srpska as a ‘genocidal creation’ and promoting constitutional 
reform that would discard many of the ethnic protections laid down within the 
Dayton Accords.  The Croat political parties have also been promoting 
constitutional change that would create a third Croat dominated entity.  What this 
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highlights is the opposing views that garner support from their ethnic constituents 
which result in the nationalist parties winning most of the votes.  Encouraged by 
their political leaders, allegiances remain linked to ethnic groups rather than to 
the central state itself.238 
 
The Role of the International Community in 
Bosnia’s Stability    
 
The importance of the international involvement in the reform of the security 
sector in Bosnia cannot be overstated.  Not since the end of the Second World 
War has the US and European states committed so much resources to reform a 
state’s security sector.239 In this section the study turns to the intervention from 
the international community by considering two elements: how the occurrences 
both regional and continental are shaping the reforms in the defence forces of 
Bosnia and also the input by the international community is assisting in this 
process.  
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The exploration of the global geopolitical dynamics is the first crucial step to 
having a better grasp of the security challenges that Bosnia is currently facing. 240  
These challenges are largely the consequence of the growing disparities in the 
economic and social developments of people and the ever increasing gap that 
exists between the rich and poor. These challenges also take the form of 
international terrorism fueled by religious fundamentalism to advance political 
goals.  
 
There is also the constant threat to the environment due to industrial and 
technological development, the unregulated production and sale of weapons and 
the forced migration as a consequence of armed conflict, racial strife, ethnic 
intolerance and/or political pressures in autocratic, undemocratic regimes. 
Moreover, there are also security challenges that are related to the various forms 
of organized crimes that underpin the constant social and political instability in 
countries across the globe.241 These security challenges are prolific across the 
globe and call for the efforts of individual nations and a coalition of nation states 
to address them.  
 
In the same vein, the regional socio-economic and political dynamics in the 
Southeastern Europe invariably impacts on the security concerns of Bosnia.   
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Notably, Southeast Europe was the stage where various inter-ethnic conflicts 
were waged during the mid 1990’s – not only in Bosnia but also the conflict in 
Kosovo in 1999.  These conflicts resulted in the destruction of the economic 
structures across the region, especially with the large death toll and displacement 
of the population who consisted of the people that ran the economy. The 
infrastructure also suffered extensively.  The social and psychological 
consequences were considerable, exhibited by inter-ethnic hatred. The political 
ramifications include the witnessing of various cases of attempted secessions by 
ethnic nationalities in pursuit of autonomy with the region. 242 
 
Another example of regional challenges that impacts on the security of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is the geo-strategic position of the region in such a manner that 
it provides some very important routes that connect the larger Europe continent 
to Asia. These routes are commonly used to facilitate commerce between the 
two continents by for example, transporting goods such as oil and natural gas. 
The routes are also used for illicit trade in human, weapons and drug trafficking. 
They therefore become a security threat to the region since they create an 
avenue for proliferation of illegal weapons that are sorely needed by ethnic 
entities that are determined to protect themselves.  The routes can also be used 
by international terrorist groups to plan and carry out attacks elsewhere in 
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Western Europe.243 In this way, the social, political and economic developments 
have shaped the defence reform agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
The second way in which the international community has influenced the reforms 
of the defence forces in Bosnia is through direct involvement. The international 
and regional organisations have come to play a significant role in the stability of 
Bosnia. 244  This however has not always been the case. In 1992 at the beginning 
of the Bosnian conflict the best that the United Nations, NATO and the EU could 
do was half-heartedly support the humanitarian situation. That changed in late 
1995 when a combination of developments on the ground and the coercive 
diplomacy that was spear-headed by the United States resulted in the Dayton 
Peace Accords. Ever since then both the EU and NATO have committed funds 
and personnel in the various programs and policies that are aimed at integration 
and stabilization of Bosnia. This analysis of the involvement by the international 
community in Bosnia will now involve taking a critical look at the Dayton Peace 
Accords and what international organizations are doing to ensure there is stability 
in the country.   
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The Dayton Peace Accords   
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
otherwise referred to as the Dayton Peace Accords was ratified in November 
1995 and effectively brought an end to the fighting by creating two ethno-
nationalist entities. These entities consisted of the Bosniak - Croat Federation, 
which control about 51 percent of the geographical region of the state of Bosnia 
and the Republic Srpska, which control the remaining 49 percent of the 
country.245  
 
At first the efforts by the international community to stop the fighting and bring all 
the parties involved together to sign the agreement was confronted by a 
multiplicity of challenges. The international community was unable to stop the 
fighting through diplomatic pressure and ill-planned military action failed to 
prevent mass-murder and genocide.  It was only following the Srebrenica 
massacre did the US become fully involved with the application of air power to 
force the Presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia to gather in Dayton, Ohio to 
end the fighting and to commence negotiations for the future of Bosnia. The 
peace settlement was only a means to end the war and failed to resolve the 
underlying issues that ignited the war in the first place.  The peace settlement 
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divided the country in two and then created an inefficient state structure unable to 
cope with the process of reconciliation and reintegration. 246 
 
It is therefore argued that the governance structure of Bosnia is the product of 
the Dayton Agreement.  The signatories to the Agreement included President 
Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and 
President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia representing the warring parties and 
delegates from the United Kingdom, United States, Russia, France and 
Germany. The negotiations resulted in the creation of the Dayton Peace Accords 
that amongst other things outlined the structure of the government in Bosnia and 
provided a mandate to the international bodies to monitor the peace building 
processes in the country.  
 
In spite of its achievements, the Dayton Peace Accords has come under a 
degree of criticism including its failure to implement a strategy to guide national 
and international actors to monitor re-development and post conflict state 
building. 247 This has resulted in minimal activity and uncoordinated projects that 
are aimed at boosting stability in the country, but offer inadequate guidelines on 
military matters. The Dayton Peace Agreement was intended to be the least bad 
solution at the time in the hope that it would one day evolve to overcome the 
actual separation on the ground.  The Bosnian Serbs and to a lesser degree, the 
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Bosnian Croats agreed at Dayton because of the decentralisation that the plan 
offered.  The plan effectively recognised a state within a state, namely the 
Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serbs) and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Muslim/Croat).248 The international community believed that 
nationalist politics would in time diminish and that a more “Western-style” party 
system would develop in its place. However today in 2011, political life in Bosnia 
is still ruled by three nationalist parties. Both entities still fear each other and this 
feeling constitutes one of the main obstacles to the creation and consolidation of 
common institutions and multi-ethnic parties. Overcoming this mistrust and 
mutual suspicion may still take another decade, even a generation.  The coming 
years will be crucial for this process of reconciliation.” 249 
 
Frank and Richmond agree with this analysis when they argue that the terms of 
the Dayton Accords and its legacy appears to be dependent on a weak and 
decentralized state, taking into account that power is not only divided between 
the two main groups but it is also spread across the ten federation cantons, 149 
municipalities and the autonomous districts of Brcko. 250   Essentially, this has 
divided the governance of Bosnia in three ways: the People’s House in the 
Parliamentary Assembly has fifteen delegates, two thirds of which are from the 
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Federation while a third emanate from Republic Srpska. Worse still, this 
constitutional arrangement is duplicated at the municipal level and is 
characterized by the entrenched ethnic positions that were adopted during the 
war and still exist today.  
 
Despite great detail in many areas, the 90-page peace agreement left several 
questions unanswered and/or gave intentionally vague tasks and timelines to 
allow freedom of political maneuver. For instance, control of the Posavina 
Corridor and the Brcko district, which both the Federation and Republika Srpska 
claimed, was put into arbitration so that the rest of the agreements could 
proceed.251  Other items were also intentionally vague, requiring significant 
adjustments over the next decade as each of the actors sought a final resolution. 
These items included the mechanisms by which transition from military to civilian 
to autonomous control would occur; and the final state of relations between the 
two entities.  
With respect to the United Nations (UN); during the preparation of the Dayton 
Peace Accords, it can be deduced that the UN was not provided with a major role 
in the peace process because of the failures of both UN diplomacy and its 
peacekeeping/peacemaking efforts during the war (namely UNPROFOR).  
Wallander, Celeste, and Keohane state that "the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR 
should remind us that when there is a disparity between institutional capabilities 
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and the mission to be completed, reliance on international organisations can be a 
recipe for disaster." 252 
 
The first and most important task of the Dayton implementation process was 
creating security.  The war left Bosnia with two main security challenges: first, to 
ensure that the entities would not relapse into war; second, to include civilians in 
the cease-fire and make sure that they were no longer victims of organised 
violence.  Both security challenges had to in some way comprise the full 
spectrum of potential aggressors or what Dayton termed ‘anyone or organisation 
with military capability.’  This included reservists, military police, internal security 
forces, national guards as well as any “foreign forces” that were to be withdrawn 
after the peace accord was signed.  The parties were required to conduct law 
enforcement “in accordance with internationally recognised standards and with 
respect for internationally recognised human rights and fundamental 
freedoms."253 
The Dayton Peace Accord contained significant compromise, not only for the 
warring factions but also for the international community.  As a result of the 
negative experience with the UN/NATO dual arrangements concerning NATO air 
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strikes during the conflict, the IFOR commander was given the authority and 
discretion to take all necessary action in order to create and sustain a safe and 
secure environment.  The civilian authorities charged with the implementation of 
the Accord had no such authority or any authority to veto the military 
commander.  It is also important to note that it was the commander on the 
ground who decided what constituted non-compliance, not SACEUR or the 
NATO Council.  The military component of the Peace Accords comprised of just 
two annexes while the authority of the civilian component were contained in no 
less than ten annexes. 
The majority of political commentators in Bosnia and Herzegovina agree with 
David Chandler’s argument that the Dayton Peace Accord established peace and 
ended the war, but by no means resolved the underlying issues that caused the 
war in the first place.254  The Dayton Peace Accord provided the structural and 
institutional framework for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This 
comprised eleven annexes, in which annex 1-A and 1-B detailed the military 
aspects.  The institutional framework of the post-conflict Bosnian state imposed 
by the Dayton Peace Accord consists of a consociational power sharing 
arrangement.  Sumantra Bose writes that consociational rules and norms are 
incorporated into nearly every aspect of the Dayton Peace Accords.  The state is 
more or less a confederal union between two entities.  A “power-sharing 
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arrangement foundered on equality and parity for the federating national 
segments and a radically autonomous Republika Srpska."255 
The most striking feature of the Accords was the division of labour between the 
military and civilian implementation; the military led by NATO and the civilian, led 
by the UN sponsored High Representative, responsible for overseeing the civilian 
implementation.  From the onset a potentially competitive or rivalrous structure 
was created.  The High Representative became the most visible institution in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as the authority on the interpretation of the Peace 
Accords on the civilian implementation established in Annex 10 of the Agreement 
and supported by the Office of the High Representative.  Hence, an inter-
institution was created to manage the various players in Sarajevo and to 
strengthen guidance and adherence.  The High Representative is appointed by 
the Peace Implementation Council and approved by the UN Security Council.256  
Following a number of political scandals and hurdles placed in the way of the 
democratisation process by the ethnic nationalist political elites, in 1997 the 
powers of the High Representative were extended to include the authority to 
suspend or dismiss officials for ‘Anti-Dayton activities’ and enforce legislation.  
This was referred to as the Bonn Powers.257  The High Representative’s 
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mandate was therefore significantly enhanced.  This subsequently became a 
model for the civil implementation following the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. 
The Dayton Peace Accords, which is more or less a peace treaty, represents the 
negotiated framework of the termination of the conflict in that it brought peace to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Under the terms of the agreement, the entities agreed 
to respect each others sovereignty, maintain a cease-fire in Bosnia, and withdraw 
military forces to agreed lines of separation, approve a new constitution and hold 
Presidential and legislative elections.258 The Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat 
communities did neither negotiate nor sign the agreement, since their territories 
were not internationally recognised and their leaders were awaiting trial in the 
International War Crimes Tribunal.  Only their deputies were able to attend 
Dayton as observers.  Instead, the agreement was signed by the Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegovic, by the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and by the 
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.  This was important.  First, it implied that 
Milosevic would be able to gain approval of the Serb leadership in Bosnia and in 
Croatia for the Dayton Accords - which he did within a few days.  The critical 
question though was whether he would also be able to guarantee the 
implementation of the agreement in good faith since the Bosnian and Croat 
Serbs were the losers of Dayton and were supposed to do everything to spoil its 
implementation.  Second, Milosevic and Tudjman were thus given the 
opportunity, albeit grudgingly, to portray themselves as the guarantors of peace 
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and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than as key players in, and 
sponsors of the conflict during the previous three and a half years.259 Milosevic, 
being the President of only one republic (besides Montenegro) of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) thereby also represented his entire country and 
this at a time when that country was still not even internationally recognised. 
The Accords are composed of two distinct parts.  The very first and most 
important part of the DPA consists of ending the conflict itself, namely, "ending 
the fighting, putting down the weapons and separating forces."260 However this 
step was only the first rung on the ladder in creating a long lasting peace, 
because, as Francine Friedman argues, "stopping the fighting is a separate 
operation from making peace, removing the incentive for re-engaging in war and 
making the peace self-supporting.  These latter steps involve permanently 
stopping the war by changing the critical expectation that the war could 
resume."261 The second and more difficult mission the International Community 
has had to face has been understood as the point of departure to devise a 
functioning, viable state and assuring a lasting future of a common state for its 
citizens.  This, however, remains a pending issue even today. 
To accomplish the military part of the Agreement, the Peace Accords outlined a 
very detailed schedule for separating and drawing down the belligerent forces of 
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the Bosnian Serbs on the one side and the Bosniak-Croat Federation on the 
other.  In contrast, with respect to the civilian part, the only scheduled deadline 
was to hold national elections within nine months.  The mission of the civilian 
aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords, according to Cousens, included “a post-
war constitution and a wide range of provisions to deal with such varied aspects 
as refugee repatriation, elections and democratisation and human rights."262 
Dayton preserved the Bosnian state by creating a consociational confederation of 
two radically autonomous 'Entities' and three peoples, with a complicated system 
of power-sharing structures to be overseen by an international governor with 
wide-ranging authority.263 It divided the country into ethno nationalist homelands, 
i.e., two entities, the first one populated by Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats, the 
federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the second populated by 
Serbs, the Republika Srpska, each with its own president, government, 
parliament, police and other bodies, and as a state of three constituent peoples - 
Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs and Croats.264  Cousens adds that "Bosnian Serbs 
got a demographically sweet deal (49 percent of Bosnia territory when they 
represented only 31 percent of the pre-war population) on the one hand, but a 
territorially disappointing one on the other"265  Since their territory was split in two 
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halves and connected only by a small strip of land, the Brcko corridor was under 
separate international administration. 
The two images below represent the changing ethnic environment within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina before the war in 1991 and three years following the war in 
1998.  
 
Figure1 BiH and Herzegovina: Ethnic composition before the war (as of 1991) 266 
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Figure Two – Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Composition in 1998267 
The state has been exceptionally unbalanced and complex due to the "not less 
than five different levels of administration, taking into account the state, the two 
entities, the ten cantons of the Federation and the municipalities, as well as the 
district of Brcko."268  The Republika Srpska maintains a highly centralised 
structure where the entity government directly oversees the municipalities.  Thus, 
relations between Republika Srpska and the Federation, already tainted by 
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ethnic tensions, are further complicated by asymmetrical governmental 
structures.269  The consequence was that "the lack of political will and acts of 
blatant obstructionism on the part of elected officials have left Bosnia at times 
with little more than the trappings of state."270 
Bosnia maintained three armies, three police forces and three intelligence 
networks; all without a central government.271  Paddy Ashdown, the High 
Representative from 2002 to 2006 commented that the situation was even more 
complicated because Bosnia had approximately 1200 judges and prosecutors, 
760 legislators, 180 Ministers, four governments and 13 Prime Ministers and 
three armies in May 2002.”272 
Despite the best efforts of the international community, achieving peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in the formation of strong ethnically defined 
entities and a weak administration.273  The political system became divided along 
ethnic lines which in turn led to the creation of a weak common government.  In 
this weak government structure most of the powers were provided to the Entities, 
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but were not specifically granted to the central government. 
 
The differing perception of the Peace Accords among the ethnic groups also 
reflected further division in the thinking of the population.  The Bosniaks 
supported a robust, unified state, whereas the Serbs and Croats likened to the 
idea of decentralisation.  Critics of the Peace Accords predicted that Bosnia 
would disintegrate the moment the international military presence was withdrawn; 
the settlement appeared morally wrong and politically impractical; however still 
necessary in order to call an end to the fighting.274  The power and authority 
passed to the entities contributed to the further destabilisation of the state, it 
therefore kept the secessionist flame alive.  This posed significant challenges 
over the years in building a viable and sustainable state.  
 
The Dayton Peace Accords created a tri-national state that offered Serbs, Croats 
and Bosniaks equal protection and offers political representation and power 
according to each groups' population strength.  As a result, the central bodies of 
Bosnia require the participation and cooperation of all three ethnicities.  However 
the consociational power-sharing arrangement in Bosnia has been seen as being 
imposed rather than a decision of the people or the political representatives of 
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national groups.  This is mainly because the Peace Accord did not represent any 
of the parties preferred end state. 
 
The tri-person Presidency of Bosnia was based on territorial and national 
requirement.  Decisions are made by the Presidency was by majority but the 
objection to a decision or policy can be made by any representative of an ethnic 
group on the grounds that it is against a vital interest.  This can effectively veto a 
decision. 
The Journey Towards Sustainable Peace and 
Stability  
 
The countries of Southeast Europe have entered the first decade of the 21st 
century having successfully completed what is referred to as the first generation 
reforms. These reforms include the establishment of structures, new institutions 
of governance and a chain of responsibilities that the security sectors must 
undertake. These are accompanied by appropriate structures that enable the 
democratic control of the actors within the security sector. These countries have 
established the principles and structures through which the oversight of security 
sector issues can be achieved. Some States have even empowered their 
parliaments to oversee and approve the budget of their security sectors and to 
help eliminate the bureaucracy in the security sector. 275 If anything the essence 
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of the first generation security sector reforms was to provide the legal structures 
that were needed to reform and ‘professionalise’ the formation of the security 
sector.  
 
In Aybet’s view the first generation reforms are the external state building 
initiatives while the second generation reforms are the internal state building 
initiatives. In this case, Bosnia presents a unique case of the shift from external 
to internal state building. The external state building is an integral part of the 
Dayton Peace Accords that gave the international organizations the mandate to 
implement the agreement and powers to intervene in internal politics should the 
need arise. These powers are demonstrated by the Bonn Powers that allow the 
Office of the High Representative to impose laws and dismiss officials.276 During 
the reign of Paddy Ashdown as High Representative between 2002 and 2006, 
the Bonn Powers were implemented to the full.277 But currently Bosnia needs to 
focus on the second generation reforms, which will reduce its dependence of 
international organizations and leave the reform of the security sector in its own 
hands.  
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This process will involve the definition of missions, tasks and structures for the 
defence sector in accordance with the priorities that are laid down in the relevant 
legal documentation such as the country’s defence laws, national security 
concepts, military doctrine and the State’s constitution. In this regard all these 
reforms have been undertaken through the drafting and implementation of the 
constitutional and legislative provisions, which have clearly stipulated the roles 
and the responsibilities of the security sector. 278 
The current environment in Bosnia calls for more than just these first generation 
reforms. Judging by the prevailing international and regional circumstances, the 
first generation reforms are by no means adequate to cater for the security needs 
of Bosnia. Bosnia stagnated for well over a decade after the Dayton Peace 
Accord was signed. This makes it necessary for Bosnia to now seriously consider 
second-generation reforms that will help consolidate the democratic control of the 
defence forces; strengthen the procedures of transparency and accountability in 
the security forces; provide and enhance the manner in which structures and 
institutions will implement policies and also develop effectiveness and efficiency 
within the defence sector. These second generation reform will also include an 
increased engagement with civil society; create a robust civilian defence and 
security community and sustainment in judicial and legal reform. 279  
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Bosnia’s poor performance is best demonstrated in Country Assistance Strategy 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a report assessing the challenges and the 
opportunities of the Dayton Peace Accords.  The report highlights that Bosnia 
remains one of the poorest countries in the region with its GDP still at less than 
pre-war levels.  Economic growth sits around 6% per year and unemployment 
remains high at around 30%.  The business and economic markets are 
hampered by excessive regulatory requirements and any attempts to improve the 
state’s economic state of affairs are stymied by political gridlock and corruption at 
senior levels.  Much needed foreign investment is scarce due to the resistance 
by nationalist leaders to strengthen central institutions and the creation of a 
single economic space. 280 
 
After the enactment of the Dayton Accords, the international community was 
confronted with the new task of ensuring that the peace that they had brought 
about was sustainable on a long term basis. The international community has 
taken the initiative in helping an ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina 
implement its second generation reforms however to date participation of local 
actors has been limited to domestic political elites.  Perdan adds that the 
“security sector reform process has been characterised by intense pressure from 
international actors such as The Office of the High Representative, the OSCE, 
the EU and NATO, who have used their institutional leverage, including their 
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powers as donors, to push the reform agenda forward.”281 Noting this point, it is 
clear that security sector reform in Bosnia remains far from locally owned.    
 
There are different views on what local ownership means in practice – from the 
minimalist model of simple local support for any externally generated initiative at 
one end of the spectrum, to locally designed, financed and fully implemented 
reforms at the opposite end. Security Sector Reform in Bosnia has more or less 
so far leant towards the minimalist policy by which locals were expected to 
support and eventually take ownership over an externally defined reform 
programme. However, in the current political setting this approach has clear 
limitations. It is perhaps time to think of the Security Sector Reform ownership 
issue in Bosnia in more ambitious terms which would involve a more inclusive 
reform process enabling other stakeholders, rather than just international actors 
and/or domestic political elites to shape reform outcomes. Widening the circle of 
relevant actors allowed to participate in Security Sector Reform discussions and 
decisions would not only lead to a genuinely locally owned Security Sector 
Reform process, but could also generate more sustainable solutions and provide 
greater legitimacy to Security Sector Reform in Bosnia. The question of 
legitimacy appears to be particularly important as Security Sector Reform is 
                                                             
281 Perdan, S., Bosnia: SSR Under International Tutelage. Available at http:/ 
se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/96778/...2BB5.../13.pdf (Accessed on May 12, 2011) 
 
 131 
wrapped up in a wider state building process and until the key issue of legitimacy 
is appropriately addressed, local ownership will remain elusive. 282 
 
Beiber points out that the peace agreement for Bosnia has been practical 
especially due to the powers that it has vested on the international institutions to 
help in the implementation process.283  Indeed, there are some important 
distinctions that emerge when examining the degree and structure of 
international involvement in post-conflict Bosnia. One of these is that there are 
different organizations with unequal powers that are charged with the 
responsibility of overseeing the military and civilian aspect in the implementation 
of the peace agreement. For instance, the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force 
(IFOR), otherwise known as Implementation Force, which later became SFOR or 
Stabilization Force and currently referred to as the European Union Force 
(EUFOR) is charged with the implementation of the military aspect of the 
agreement.  
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Beiber also identifies the International Police Task Force (IPTF), a United 
Nations initiative in Bosnia that was established to oversee the local police force 
and was replaced by the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in 2003. The Office of the 
High Representative on the other hand was established to supervise the civilian 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and is supported in some aspects 
by the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU. There are also a number of 
foreign officials that are nominated by international organizations that were either 
established by international organizations or Bosnians, which form an integral 
part of Bosnian institutional structures at the joint level, for instance the 
Constitutional Court, the Human Rights Chamber and Central Bank; these 
institutions provide an additional layer of international involvement in post conflict 
Bosnia.284 
At the time when the Dayton Peace Accords was signed, the Armed Forces of 
Bosnia were split into two distinct entities. These two entities were semi-
autonomous in the sense that each had their own chain of command and also fell 
under the jurisdiction of one of the two defence ministries. This arrangement 
allowed for a total lack of accountability to a central authority by the two entity 
forces, as it should be in any functional military. Besides, the two entity forces 
were openly separated from one another and this made the control of each 
defence army to be an affair of their respective entity.285   
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Often, the international community has ‘imposed’ some externally controlled 
mechanisms of governance that are geared towards sustaining peace and 
stability in Bosnia. The international community ensured that it laid out a 
framework of governance through which Bosnia would achieve social, political 
and economic stability. In some quarters, these sets of ideological and practical 
concepts that promote democracy and market sovereignty on one hand and 
those of conflict resolution on the other, have come to be termed as democratic 
peace. Therefore the international community has both helped to strengthen the 
structures of governance in Bosnia and has ensured that peace is sustained 
through reforms in the defence forces.286 
 
This two pronged strategy is in recognition of the fact that tackling security 
threats should go hand in hand with underdevelopment issues that contribute to 
insecurity and criminalization.287 However it would be futile to just set up robust 
defence structures and personnel without addressing social issues regarding 
poverty and youth unemployment, which make it easier for ethnic leaders to 
mobilize people along their ethnic lines to compete for public goods.288  These 
issues should also be taken into consideration when designing the defence 
system of a state and resources should be allocated for their implementation.  
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The international community has laid out structures for Bosnia to enable it reform 
its defence system.   Papenkort points out that although Parliamentary oversight 
of the defence issues is a pre-requisite for PfP membership, there is currently no 
provision in law that provides that oversight capability to the state level 
Parliamentary committee.  Entity laws do provide for legislative oversight by the 
National Assembly in Republika Srpska and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina but there is insufficient exercise of this 
responsibility.289 
 
Another factor that has made Bosnia willing to adhere to the benchmarks that 
have been established by NATO is the unmanageable cost of maintaining two 
entity defence forces. Even though the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had taken the initiative of downsizing military 
personnel in both entities, it was the effects of NATO’s conditions that set in 
motion the defence reforms in Bosnia. 290 
 
According to the Global Policy Forum the significant role that Bosnia plays in 
NATO’s transformation and enlargement since the early 1990s and, also the high 
political-military stakes within Bosnia and across Europe make it reasonable to 
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conclude that Bosnia is also going to be a significant part of the future of the 
Alliance. 291 The unsuccessful efforts of the United Nations (UN) and the 
European Union (EU) in conflict management in Bosnia in 1991-1995 have 
strongly influenced the Alliance to be supportive regarding the country’s 
membership aspiration. The western Balkans constitutes a fragile region which 
could easily explode into violence if the situation is not maintained under control. 
The NATO enlargement process supports the Alliance’s basic goal of enhancing 
security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. By embracing 
Bosnia, NATO would send the message that stability and security in this country 
and in the whole Euro-Atlantic area will be enhanced and maintained under 
control.  
 
NATO has been at the forefront of the new developments in Bosnia, setting the 
pace at which the defence forces within the country will be reformed to meet the 
current security needs. In the paper titled Partnership for Peace and Security 
Sector Reform, Morfew succinctly lays out NATO’s agenda in Bosnia. He argues 
that the international community has extended its focus from Defence Reform to 
the wider aspects of Security Sector Reform. From a NATO perspective, Security 
Sector Reform encompasses but is not restricted to defence reform, security 
service reform and border security. While many international organisations are 
involved in Security Sector Reform, NATO understands that in some areas, it 
only plays a supporting role.  From a NATO perspective actors in the security 
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sector are limited to: military and defence organisations; law enforcement 
agencies with military status; and, intelligence and security services. The national 
bodies responsible for the oversight of the security sector and therefore under 
the umbrella of Security Sector Reform, will include, but not necessarily be 
limited to government; national security advisory bodies; legislature and 
legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, and foreign 
affairs; financial management bodies such as finance ministries, budget offices, 
financial audit and planning units; and civil society organisations such as civilian 
review boards and public complaints commissions. 292 
 
So far Bosnia has heavily benefited by cooperating with NATO and ever since 
Bosnia joined the PfP Program in December 2006, the country has received 
cooperation from NATO partners which has gone along way to address the 
security concerns within mutually agreed goals.293 The Bosnian government has 
signed the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO, as required of 
their national legislation. Consequently, the agreement has facilitated the 
cooperation within the entity armies and other international militaries within the 
NATO partnership. Today, NATO and Bosnia are continuously improving the 
sharing of information in the fight against terrorism. NATO member countries are 
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also helping Bosnia establish capacities and provide advice to improve the 
existing national apparatus. 
 
The introductory chapter introduced the reader to defence reform in Bosnia.  The 
following section offers a more comprehensive analysis of the progress of the 
defence reform efforts.  Defence Reform is among the principle pre-requisites for 
Bosnia to integrate with NATO and the EU.  The pre-requisites included PfP 
membership which is considered an important step towards European 
integration.  The Bosnian political leadership announced the goal of membership 
in the European Union and the NATO security alliance during the visit by NATO 
Secretary General, Lord Robertson in June 2001.  Lord Robertson spoke of the 
many reforms needed for Bosnia including the adoption of a state defence law, 
central command over the armed forces, democratic and parliamentary oversight 
of the armed forces, the creation of a Bosnian Ministry of Defence (MOD), 
transparent military budgets, common equipping and training standards, 
strengthening of state level institutions and the fulfillment of obligations to the 
ICTY under the terms and conditions under the Dayton Peace Accords.294 
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In recognition of the commitment and progress made in the reform efforts, Bosnia 
was invited to join the PfP during the RIGA Summit in November 2006.  The 
state promptly embarked on a structured course to fulfill the PfP goals.  This 
commitment has been welcomed by NATO member countries that have 
proposed ambitions action plans and assistance in reform efforts to assist Bosnia 
towards this goal.  Another milestone took place in April 2008 during the 
Bucharest Summit when NATO members invited Bosnia to begin an intensified 
dialogue which consisted of discussions on political, financial, military and 
security matters.295  This represented another step towards NATO membership 
for Bosnia.  In 2004, the High Representative/European Union Special 
Representative (HR/EUSR) in Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown, stated that: “If there was 
one issue that everybody in every ethnicity, every political party and every corner 
of the country is agreed upon, it is that Bosnia’s ultimate destination is Europe”296 
This high level understanding created the pre-conditions for successful Defence 
Reform in Bosnia.  Defence Reform was among the top priorities for both NATO 
members and partnership countries in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/PfP 
community.297  As the PfP document states, the reform of the defence system is 
a very important part of Bosnia’s state structure and focuses on two key points, 
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firstly, the establishment of a single defence organisation that falls under the 
command and control of efficient state institutions and secondly restructuring of 
the armed forces to enable the implementation of legitimate defence objectives of 
Bosnia and its foreign political aspirations in terms of security, specifically 
collective defence and security.298 
As already mentioned several times within this paper, the end of the war saw two 
formal armies in Bosnia, the army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the army of the Republika Srpska.  In reality however there were three as the 
army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided along ethnic 
lines; one Croat and one Muslim.  This saw two separate defence systems 
representing the two separate entities forming the state of Bosnia.299  The 
consequence of this was that the central state had no effective control over the 
armed forces neither oversight nor command and control because command was 
exercised at the entity level.  James Locher, the former co-chairman of the 
Defence Reform Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Michael Donley, a 
former advisor to the Defence Reform Commission wrote that “The communist 
inheritance included highly politicised command elements, weak civilian control 
below the head of state, almost no connectivity or communication between the 
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Defence Ministries and general staffs, lack of transparency in budgeting and 
administration and weak parliamentary oversight.  The post-war environment was 
characterised by fragmented political authority and lack of trust.”300 
In September 2003 following a lengthy period of negotiation and consensus 
building, the Defence Reform Commission achieved unanimous agreement on 
the way forward.301  The PfP report created a new structure for the armed forces.  
The structure differentiated between two chains of command, Operational and 
Administrative.  The Operational chain of command established responsibility for 
the employment of military forces, whilst the administrative chain of command 
provided responsibility to the two entity Ministries of Defence for the organisation, 
manning, training and equipping their respective entity armies.  This new 
structure was supported by the new Bosnian defence law.  This was largely seen 
as an intermediate step in a longer term plan to consolidate the entity armed 
forces to a united military establishment. 
The new organisational structure of the armed forces required a reduction in 
numbers to meet the optimal size for the political and economic realities in 
Bosnia.  The process of downsizing began as soon as the fighting ended in 1995.  
By 1999 the number of military personnel had been reduced from 250,000 to 
35,000 and then to 19,800 by 2002.  In 2004 the Bosnian presidency decided 
that the two entity armed forces would have a ceiling of 12,000 troops.  The  
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Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 8,000 and the Republika Srpska 4,000.  
Further, the number of conscripts would be reduced to 12,600 and Reservist 
figures were set at 60,000.302 This represents a total reduction of 95% in 
personnel in less than a decade.   
According to a Defence Reform Committee report, Bosnia’s defence spending 
was considerably larger that other European countries of similar size, which is 
significant when understanding the size of Bosnia’s economy.  Bosnia’s inability 
to afford and sustain a large defence force was the principle reason why the 
reduction of personnel and resolving personnel issues became a major priority 
for reform.  Without real reform of the armed forces, Bosnia will continue to be 
unable to fulfill PfP membership requirements.  Within the non-Defence Reform 
Commission requirements for PfP membership is full cooperation with the ICTY 
which has been a long standing requirement for Bosnia’s acceptance into the 
European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.  Nikola Radavanovic noted in 2004 that 
the “main obstacle towards Bosnia joining the PfP is the lack of cooperation with 
the ICTY.”303  However the arrest of former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan 
Karadzic in 2008 and the more recent apprehension of the former Bosnian Serb 
army chief, General Ratko Mladic in May 2011 will undoubtedly bring the country 
closer to EU membership. 
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To be successful, any reform requires an effective implementation plan.  The 
Defence Reform Commission has given this considerable attention and has 
recommended the creation of the Transition Management Office whose 
responsibilities will be to support the implementation of defence reform.304  
Defence Reform has had to continue in order to transform into a modern, 
effective and affordable Defence Force.   
By 2005, the entities had ‘combined’ (in theory only) their military forces and 
defence ministries and had agreed to amend their constitutions accordingly.  By 
the end of 2005, the entity parliaments had adopted requisite laws to allow the 
transfer of defence capability and personnel from the two entities to the central 
state.305 
Defence reform continued to progress throughout 2006 following the 
implementation of the Defence Law in 2005.  This is in line with the 
recommendations of the Defence Reform Commission in order to meet the aim 
of establishing a single defence force.306  By the beginning of 2006 all defence 
related responsibilities and personnel came under the umbrella of the central 
state government.  Later in 2006 the state government determined the size, 
                                                             
304 Defense Reform Commission, The Path to Partnership for Peace, 6. 
305 International Crisis Group, Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy (Sarajevo: 
International Crisis Group,[2007]),16,,http://doc.operationspaix.net/serv1/ICG_ensuring_bosnias_future_2007-02-15_.pdf 
(accessed 12 September 2010). 
306 Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report, AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century (Sarajevo: Ministry of 
Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005);http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/dwn/2005DRCReport-English.pdf (accessed 13 
September 2010). 
 143 
structure and location of the defence force.307  Conscription came to an end, 
enabling the defence force to become an all volunteer force.  From mid 2006 the 
structure of the armed forces was determined as 10,000 full time, professional 
military personnel, 5,000 reserve forces and 1,000 civilians.308 
In accordance with the Bosnian constitution, the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Services are comprised of all three members of the Bosnian Presidency 
who by law perform the responsibilities of Commander in Chief.  The top to 
bottom command chain starts with the Presidency and flows down through the 
Minister of Defence, to the Chairman of the Joint Staff and down to the 
Commanders of the Operational and Support Command and subordinate 
units.309  The progress of defence reform in Bosnia to this point has been 
impressive and progress continues towards achieving the necessary 
requirements for its successful implementation, the consolidation of personnel 
and infrastructure and the modernisation of capability in order to enable them to 
meet NATO standards.  The author believes that full integration will only occur 
once the ethnic dilemma has been resolved and when the ethnic communities 
begin to trust one another once more.  It is difficult to see progress in this area 
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while the state’s nationalist parties remain so influential in the leadership of 
Bosnia. 
Plans for the Future 
Despite inheriting elements of the defence structure from the former communist 
regime, Bosnia is still managing to meet nearly all of NATO’s requirements.  
Major General Richard Whiteman, the NATO Commander in Sarajevo, remarked 
in 2008 that “Defence Reform in particular remains one of the key reform 
successes in Bosnia and continues to serve as an example of what can be 
achieved when there is unity, cooperation and dialogue amongst the people.”310  
Defence Reform in Bosnia is now into it’s implementation phase and so far 
reform efforts have been centered more on structural (or hardware) changes to 
the system rather than on culture (or software) changes.  A former student of the 
US Naval Post Graduate School, Lieutenant Colonel Janos Szonyegi from the 
Hungarian Army noted that “In an established democracy, with strong traditions 
of civilian control of the armed forces, the process of defence reform can be 
limited to ‘a change of hardware like restructuring or professionalism.  In post-
communist societies however, the biggest challenge is arguably the ‘change of 
software, namely the whole culture and mentality of the defence 
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establishment.”311 Bosnia is a country that needed a change of ‘software’ in order 
to prepare for the future.  This is a process that requires a substantial amount of 
time, resources and effort. 
Despite the recognised achievements to date, the shift to a unified Defence 
Force has been completed on paper only.  The Defence Forces still operate 
separate doctrine; it remains politically divided; equipped differently and 
operationally uncoordinated and mismatched.  There is not the funding or the 
public support to rectify the deficiencies.  Janes assesses Bosnia as a “deeply 
divided nation, with serious implications for the armed forces.”312  Jane’s claims 
that among the more positive moves that may enhance the transformation of the 
Bosnian Defence Force are the opportunities presented by entry into the PfP 
program.  Major General Richard Whiteman commented “Defence reform also 
entails the obligations that Bosnia has incurred as well as the commitments that 
have been made within the framework of the PfP, including reform goals within 
the planning and review process, as well as wider security and political 
obligations that Bosnia will incur as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) 
process develops.”313  
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Conclusion 
Chapter Three has explored the historical background to the conflict in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the history of the former Yugoslavia.  The ethnic divide in 
Bosnia is closely linked to the ethnic fragmentation that were brought about by 
the Milosevic regime. Bosnia is still suffering the effects of negative ethnicity 
causing Bosnia’s population to seek refuge within their ethnic community.  
 
The thesis has also studied the structure of the Bosnian government and 
analysed the concept of democracy in the governance of the country and how 
these two are crucial in the progress of defence reforms. The weakness of the 
Bosnian government is entrenched in the constitution of the country, which 
allows for ethnic presidency on a rotational basis. Most of these Presidents have 
no national interest at heart and therefore it is no surprise that the foreign policy 
of the country is such a failure. Besides, the mandate of these Presidents is 
compromised by the power sharing pact, which cannot allow them to be 
nationalists. The Council of Ministers is the most inefficient department of the 
executive arm for it has so far failed to assist the government of the day to fully 
implement policies. Due to this the international community has had to step in to 
ensure that the developmental agenda of the country is implemented.  
 
Chapter Three also established that the parliament of Bosnia is true reflection of 
the fragmented society in the country. The constitution illustrates how each entity 
will be represented in terms of numbers and this has only helped to entrench 
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ethnic divide since the representatives from each entity are subservient to the 
interest of their block, not those of the nation at large. The Bosnian parliament 
does not fully represent its people as it pays less attention to the minorities in the 
country. 
 
The role that the international community has played in stopping the violence in 
1995 and laying out the foundation for sustainable peace has been analysed. 
Research has established that without the assistance of the international 
community, it is likely that Bosnia would be viewed as a failed state. The Dayton 
Peace Accords that later became the centre of Bosnia’s constitution was crafted 
with the help of the international community. Additionally, the reform efforts seen 
within the defence forces so far is a product of the partnership between 
international organizations such as NATO and the Bosnian government. 
However also noted is the continued presence and involvement of the 
international community in Bosnia and how the international presence is likely to 
do more harm than good in the long term as it does not allow Bosnia to develop 
and govern itself without the assistance of the international intervention. After 
providing the first generation reforms the international community is now in a 
position to allow the state to pursue second generation reforms, the only way 
sustainable peace in the country will be secured.  
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Defence Reform is one of the key steps towards integration with the EU and the 
NATO Alliance.  Two points are important in this respect, the first is the civilian 
and democratic control of all the armed forces; the second and at the same time 
a pre-condition for democratic control is the organisation of a ministry and a 
general staff at the state level of the state, which has effective control over the 
military organisation.  A key point established within this chapter is that whilst 
there may be a shift to a unified defence force, the defence force continues to be 
ethnically and politically divided and operates separate doctrine.  Clearly, 
although the achievements made this far have been impressive, there is still 
much improvement of Bosnia’s armed forces in order to satisfy NATO standards.  
Further, with its limited military resources, it is important for Bosnia to find a niche 
where it can effectively contribute to the NATO alliance in support of International 
Peace and Stability.314 
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Chapter Four – THE CREATION OF ETHNICALLY 
SEGREGATED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA   
 
Introduction 
Chapter Three sought to understand how ethnicity linked to political dynamics 
and established that ethnicity in itself does not bring about conflict, with this being 
demonstrated by the history of Yugoslavia and its absence of resolving ethnic 
disputes through violent means.  Rather, Bosnia’s ethnic conflict of the 1990’s 
was a product of self-serving interest by the political elite using ethnicity to trigger 
civil strife. In this chapter, the thesis investigates the causes of the current ethnic 
division within the Bosnian Defence Force, a dilemma that remains despite the 
fact that the entity armed forces share a common history of unity.  As stated 
earlier in this paper, it is important to note that the armed forces of Bosnia reflect 
Bosnian society as a whole and therefore societal factors will inevitably impact on 
the culture of the armed forces.  Politicians who disrespect the state convey a 
negative message to the military.  Some political leaders act in support of 
demilitarization efforts which also act to undermine the legitimacy of the armed 
forces and reinforce ethnic separation.  Political leaders are also often in a 
position to have a decisive influence on the appointment of the military’s strategic 
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leadership which again influence the culture of the armed forces from the top 
down.315 
The Causes of Ethnic Segregation 
Although the current ethnic structure in Bosnia remains antagonistic at certain 
levels, the ethnic factions still share common basic conditions: ethnic separation; 
public fear and insecurity; a lack of democratic accountability; the breakdown in 
the rule of law; and a lack of institutions able to control illegal economic activity. 
By sharing a common strategic interest in maintaining these conditions, the 
entities work separately but in parallel to sustain ethnic conflict, while at the same 
time resisting the efforts of the international community to seriously unite the 
defence force under a single chain of command. The implication is that true 
ethnic reconciliation is reliant on progress of a second strand of the peace 
process – liberalization of the economy and society.316 In this section, the thesis 
examines in detail at the various causes of segregation within the Bosnian 
defence force.  
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A Legacy of Failures within the Former 
Yugoslavia 
 
There has been much comment within existing literature that suggests that the 
ethnic rivalry found in Bosnia is a product of ancient ethnic hatred. These 
assertions have been disputed by objective historical appreciations as 
demonstrated earlier in this paper.317  
Of the six republics that comprised the Former Yugoslavia; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was the most diverse in that it neither had a majority religious 
community or a majority national group. According to the paper titled Country 
Assistance Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009-2013, the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia opened a bloody historical chapter in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
political crisis in Yugoslavia saw the Yugoslav People Army (JNA) adopting a 
neutral stand but the general ideology and ethnic composition of the JNA 
leadership quickly took the side of the Bosnian Serb leader, Slobodan 
Milosevic.318    
 
The segregation of the Defence Forces of Bosnia is somewhat strange noting 
that the entity armies had previously served alongside one another in previous 
times. Maybe Bosnia was not created by the Dayton Peace Accords as it 
appears, but rather is a product of a long rich history of inter-ethnic military 
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heritage and experience. This military had in fact fought for two big Empires: the 
Ottoman Empire and the Austria-Hungarian Empire.319  Despite this history, the 
armed forces of Bosnia today exist under very different circumstances and their 
loyalty to the state plays second to their loyalty to their respective ethnic block.    
 
Bosnia was created as a state following its secession from Yugoslavia in March 
1992 and has existed to date without an effective military capable of protecting its 
fragile independence and sovereignty.320 However the formation of the country 
itself, ethnic oriented as it was, does not adequately explain the existence of 
these segregated forces. The segregation in the Bosnian defence forces is 
closely related to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, from which Bosnia 
was founded. Following the 1990 victory of the nationalist parties, Yugoslavia 
entered into a state of crisis that eventually led to the secession of Slovenia and 
Croatia in mid 1991.321 The nationalist parties within Bosnia sought to 
consolidate their newly attained power through cadre change that was created in 
a way as to favour their respective ethnic communities. There emerged the 
process of ethnic based inclusion and exclusion in both private and public 
sectors in December 1990. This process produced deep divisions within the 
Bosnian society.  The manner in which these changes took shape is evident only 
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in the scattered example of the process, which went on until the war ultimately 
broke out.322  
The first step of this process consisted of the removal of all communist members 
from positions of responsibility at the higher levels of state administration 
replacing them with the three nationalist parties.323 The nationalists strove to 
ensure that ministers and deputy ministers in each ministry came from different 
parties. However, each of the three national parties had serious reservations 
about the other two; they therefore often used their blocking powers to prevent 
ministries from effectively performing their normal functions. This resulted into 
paralysis and due to the attrition of the non-Muslim cadre in the ministries; the 
Sarajevo government came to be largely under the control of the SDA.  Since 
Bosnia was a highly centralized state it became apparent that the SDA and the 
Muslim ethnic community would effectively prevent other ethnic communities 
from accessing power at least at the level of the central government.  
The genesis of the segregation in the Bosnian military has its origins in the 
composition and structure of the Yugoslavia army, which was foundered along 
ethnic lines. Just before the war broke out in 1992, the JNA had become an 
almost homogenous Serbian force that had seen the non-Serbian members of 
the JNA desert the force. Even though the JNA had officially withdrawn from 
Bosnia immediately after the country had seceded from Yugoslavia, it left behind 
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a legacy that resembled the disintegrated JNA, especially with the composition of 
the three entities. During the war all the Bosnian armed forces experienced 
desertion and disintegration and reformed along ethnic divides in order to 
survive. After the war the army of Bosnia broached the subject of multi-ethnic co-
existence but this idea was later dropped, making way for nationalistic 
undertones that advocated for segregated armed forces.324  
The forces at play within Bosnian society are also more complex than they first 
appear. According to the paper titled, Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, “inter-ethnic conflict may seem to be the dominant feature and 
the root cause of resistance to the goals of the peace process. However, ethnic 
reconciliation represents only one axis of the peace process. The other axis is 
the transition from a communist to a free society, building an infrastructure of 
democratic and free-market institutions, laws and traditions from a limited 
base.”325 While each of these axes in its own right presents formidable 
challenges, the interaction of the two magnifies the problems immensely. Inter-
ethnic hostility is a tool used by the nationalist regimes to maintain their power.326 
Bosnia has yet to achieve all these because the country is still hamstrung by the 
negative legacy that Bosnia inherited from the former Yugoslavia.   
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Nationalist Competitions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina   
 
Following secession from Yugoslavia in 1992, Bosnia was faced with the 
dilemma around the segregation of the defence forces since each of the ethnic 
entity already viewed each other with mutual suspicion. For instance, the 
formation of the Croatian Defence Council in May 1992 was a reaction by the 
Bosnian Croat community to the perceived threat posed by the political ambitions 
of the Bosnian Serbs. Notably, the Bosnian Muslim leadership was slow in 
recognizing this threat and as a result fell behind the Bosnian Croat community in 
the establishment of their respective defence forces.327 
The then government of the Republic of Bosnia was reluctant to act on these 
divisions and the private citizens and Muslim patriotic organizations assumed the 
task of organizing Bosnian Muslims for defence. Although they had greater 
manpower resources, the Muslims were poorly led, had a less effective military 
force in comparison to those of others competing ethnic entities and were also ill 
equipped militarily.328   By the time Bosnia declared its independence in March, 
1992, the government of President Izetbegovic knew that there was a security 
threat to the new Republic, which was posed by the six corps of the JNA and 
their over 120 000 men in the paramilitary forces of the Serbian Democratic 
Party. In April, the President declared that a state of imminent threat existed and 
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created a new Territorial Defence organization whose personnel consisted of the 
district staffs. This organization was intended to incorporate the various armed 
forces groups, including the Patriotic League into a formal defence structure.329  
As Shrader states, the structure of the newly formed Bosnia defence force 
primarily assumed the form of the old JNA organization, which had grouped the 
forces of several municipalities together on a Territorial Defence district. In early 
1991, the JNA had ordered the disbandment of the Territorial Defence units in 
Bosnia and with the cooperation from President Izetbegovic, the JNA were 
permitted to disarm the Territorial units and redistribute their weapons to the 
Bosnian Serbs. This order was however ignored by the Bosnian Croats and the 
Muslim patriots who went ahead to successfully take over the existing Territorial 
structures, including its facilities and many of its weapons.330    
At first the Territorial forces in Bosnia had included both the Croats and Muslims. 
But after Bosnia began to emphasize its Islamic character, the Croat members 
left to join the HVO, especially when it became clear that it was only the Muslim 
members who received promotions and positions of responsibility in that 
organization. In any event, the organization did not suffer a shortage of 
manpower: the Muslim dominated Territorial forces operated under the laws and 
regulations that had governed the Territorial forces of the former Yugoslavia and 
were mainly tied to the location where they were recruited. The influx of Muslim 
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refugees from places such as eastern Bosnia and Bosanska-Kajrina in late 1992 
provided large numbers of military personnel who were desperately needed to fill 
the ranks of the Territorial units and also to create new mobile units that were 
required for offensive operations.331   
Attempts by the Bosnian Serbs to prevent any efforts that would culminate into a 
single defence ministry at the state level between the years 1995 to 2003 should 
therefore be explored in the context of their self-perception as a state. The two 
Bosnian armies that were previously multi-ethnic in outlook but ended up 
ethnically segregated demonstrate the trench mentality that came about after the 
war. With the war coming to an end, the three armies were well established in 
their tripartite ethnicities and only reflected the divisions of the society of Bosnia 
along ethnic lines.332 
The Provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords   
The Dayton Peace Accords separated the ethnic population of Bosnia in 1995 by 
creating a zone of separation.  The concept of the zone of separation was to 
separate entities to limit contact between the warring factions.  This would reduce 
the opportunity for further ethnic violence.  The zone of separation created a 
1000 mile line that that roughly divided Bosnia in half.333  The Bosnian Serbs 
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occupied the area north of the line while the Bosnian Croats and Muslims 
occupied the territory to the south. 
Imposing the Dayton Peace Accords commenced with a number of phases.  The 
first required the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims to withdraw their forces to 
positions approximately two kilometers from the agreed line of separation.  This 
would provide a four kilometer wide demilitarized zone between the belligerent 
forces.  In Sarajevo itself, the zone would be two kilometers wide instead of four.   
Phase II required the entity forces to withdraw to a second line, which became 
known as the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL).  The IEBL was to be the final 
demarcation between the Republika Srpska in the north and the Muslim Croat 
Federation in the south.  In many areas the agreed ceasefire line and the IEBL 
became one of the same thing.  There were however some differences; phase II 
provided 45 days from the IFOR deployment for the entity armed forces to 
withdraw  at least two kilometers back, behind the IEBL.  IFOR troops would 
occupy the four kilometer wide separation zone for 90 days and once IFOR 
withdrew from the area, the gaining faction were permitted to occupy their 
respective territory within the bounds of the IEBL.334  
On December 15 1995, the United Nations Security Council authorized the 
NATO intervention force, known as IFOR to conduct military operations in Bosnia 
under the provisions specified in the Dayton Peace Accords.  Unlike 
UNPROFOR, IFOR were not employed as a peacekeeping force, rather IFOR 
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was mandated with a peace enforcement role under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter which authorized the use of force if and when required to ensure 
compliance with the provisions laid down in the Dayton Peace Accords.335 
IFOR deployed into Bosnia on 20 December 1995 and consisted of 
approximately 60,000 troops from a number of troop contributing countries.336  
The structure of IFOR consisted of a headquarters located in Sarajevo and 
subordinate commands; Multi-National Division North, led by the US, located in 
the northern third of the country; Multi-National Division South West, led by the 
British and located in the Western third of the Country and Multi-National Division 
South East, led by the French, located in the Eastern third of the country.  All 
three Multi-National Divisions occupied territory across both territories and each 
sector included a significant length of the IEBL that separated the opposing 
factions. 
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Figure Three – Bosnia and Herzegovina: NATO Areas of Responsibility337 
Whilst IFOR performed its mission in accordance with the military provisions 
outlined in the Dayton Peace Accords, there were also important tasks 
associated with maintaining the separation of the entity armed forces.  For 
example, IFOR had to secure routes through the IEBL to ensure freedom of 
movement for IFOR units, humanitarian assistance and general civilian traffic.  
IFOR also operated check points and daily patrols through the IEBL, not only to 
ensure freedom of movement but also to ensure that factions were not 
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attempting to cross the IEBL to occupy former positions.  IFOR also established 
Joint Military Commissions (JMC) which were arranged meetings between senior 
IFOR and Entity Commanders.  These meetings were held regularly in order to 
share information and resolve disputes.  The meetings also provided IFOR the 
platform to report violations to the entity commanders and to warn of the 
consequences of non-compliance.  With only a few exceptions, the factions 
complied with the provisions of the Peace Accords and were effectively 
separated by 3 Feb 1996. 
With respect to the separation, the author believes that separating ethnic factions 
as a concept is a negative approach that leads to long-term negative 
consequences that outweigh the short term benefits.338  Separation can be seen 
as legitimizing actions such as violent aggression and ethnic cleansing and risks 
promoting its proliferation.  It also creates realities that become difficult to retract.  
An often heard criticism on the ground amongst the Bosniak community of the 
intervention in Bosnia was that the Dayton Agreement allowed the Bosnian Serbs 
to retain 49 percent of the Bosnian territory as the Republika Srpska even though 
Bosnian Serbs had only accounted for 30 percent of the pre-war population.  The 
author suggests that some may view this as a case of the Bosnian Serbs being 
rewarded for their actions undertaken throughout the war.  The risk here is that 
this may become a precedent for future interventions in countries involved in 
domestic ethnic conflict. 
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Another argument against ethnic separation is that it fails to resolve the 
underlying reasons for the conflict.  Consequently the conflict largely remains 
unresolved.  Ethnic separation therefore only creates deeper ethnic cleavages 
and creates the potential for further grievances, laying the foundations for further 
future ethnic conflict.  It can also lay responsibility for the conflict with the local 
population, many of whom did not take part in any of the ethnic fighting.  Most 
Importantly ethnic separation prevents the process of social integration and 
reconciliation between the ethnic populace.  
Despite these challenges, Bosnia has experienced change, politically, socially 
and economically. There has been the large scale return of displaced persons, 
the recovery of property by the victims of the strife and a comprehensive process 
of demilitarization. Furthermore, the freedom of movement amongst the 
populations has improved and notwithstanding current tensions, inter-ethnic 
violence is scarce.339 There has also been the formation of new institutions at the 
state level of government, which has seen to the expansion of an integrated 
single market.340 Notwithstanding, these gains, the fact that segregation in the 
defence forces still exist is a trend that must be addressed in order to ensure that 
the peace within the country is sustainable.  
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The Dayton Peace Accords brought about a number of changes to the political 
and economic structure of Bosnia. It also set in motion the program through 
which the defence system of the country would be reformed. The agreement 
introduced the process of defence reform, establishing separate forces in each of 
the two entities within the state.  However, these entity armies were established 
not only to safeguard the state from any possible outside aggression but to also 
ensure the security of the three ethnic populations.341  The Accords sought to 
create a stable and viable Bosnian state however all the reform efforts such as 
common defence structure, common currencies, state insignia etc were all 
enforced by the international community with resistance from the ethnic entities, 
most notably from the Republika Srpska and most of the ruling political parties 
which had an interest in maintaining a weak and ethnically segregated state.342  
It comes as no surprise therefore that the international community has been the 
force behind the reform efforts within Bosnia. 
The Dayton Accords helped to further the segregation in the defence forces by 
recognizing the divisive social structures that existed at that time. The conflict 
played a crucial role in disrupting the superseding political conviction of a multi-
ethnic country and gave way to the fear of domination by some ethnic minorities. 
The population had during the conflict felt insecure and not receiving adequate 
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protection by the state, the people had sought refuge in their ethnic identities. In 
the aftermath of the conflict, the political convictions were not robust enough or 
rather quite clear to facilitate the rallying of support from all the ethnic groups 
within the military. Therefore, in choosing to recognize the three constituent 
ethnic groups of Bosnia and their respective defence forces, the Accords were 
merely using the unique characteristics of the conflict to reach a resolution.  
Despite the progress made in Bosnia, the fact that the ethnic phenomena still 
impacts on nearly every aspect of the post war life in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
can hardly be ignored. For one, the country is not just divided into two 
geographical entities, it remains ethnically segregated. This segregation is 
evident not just within the defence sector but in other sectors such as education 
and the media, which openly cater for the interests of particular ethnic groupings. 
In spite of there being legal structures to discourage negative ethnicity, there still 
exists the discrimination of persons in employment, housing and social services 
on the ground of their ethnic background, a trend that is supported by the 
governmental systems.343  
Subsequently, the individuals who are amongst the minorities in their 
communities, have constantly resisted this system with a significant number of 
refugees that were displaced during the war opting not to return home due to the 
fear of threats and discrimination. The youths who had spent their formative 
years in the post war environment that is characterized by ethnic divisions are in 
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dire need of a positive model for the relations between ethnic groups. 344 The 
defence forces can hardly live out the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina; thus 
their desire to operate as a separate entity, by extension, mirrors the desire of 
their ethnic population.   
Papenkort argues that before the High Representative changed the Constitution 
of the Republika Srpska in April 2003, the constitution had promoted the original 
self understanding of the entity as a sovereign state, more fragrantly than that of 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is in the sense that the 
competencies related to defence reinforce a view of statehood, in which the 
framework for defence was defined with supremacy resting with entity 
institutions. The Republika Srpska’s Constitution and Law on Defence gives the 
entity President the supreme command and control authority over the army and 
this fails to recognize the supremacy of the State for matters of defence.345  
The other cause of this segregation can be considered as being structural: 
 “In the Federation of Bosnia and herzegivina, the legal and constitutional 
provisions relating to defence matters are inconsistent.  The Constitution grants 
command and control authority to the Entity President, whereas the Law on 
Defence grants it to pre-Dayton figures, with a caveat that this must be resolved 
once the Dayton institutions were established.  Because these interim 
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arrangements were not updated, constitutional and legal inconsistency and 
ambiguity remain about whether some command and control responsibilities still 
rest with the institutions of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”346  
Conclusion 
Recognising that the unification of the Defence Forces of Bosnia is critical in 
attaining stability of the country in the future, the causes of segregation in the 
Bosnian army have been analysed. This is important in the sense that by 
understanding this, the state will be in a position to chart the way forward towards 
resolving this dilemma. There are three key factors responsible for encouraging 
the Defence Forces to remain loyal to their ethnic entities, rather than uniting to 
cater for the security needs of the state of Bosnia. These causes include: the 
nationalist competition in Bosnia, the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords 
and the negative legacy of the former Yugoslavia. Worth noting is the fact that 
there is a thin line delineating these causes; they all seem to be intertwined. If 
anything, you cannot address one cause without subtly touching on the other, 
largely due to the fact that they all end up creating the same problem.  
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Chapter Five – THE EFFECT OF ETHNICALLY 
SEGREGATED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA   
 
Introduction 
Chapter Four explored the causes of ethnic segregation in the Bosnian Defence 
Forces.  While some of the causes derive from the Dayton Peace Accords and 
were created to appease the warring factions and the interests of bringing a swift 
end to the violence, the ongoing ethnic segregation continues to undermine the 
defence reform efforts in the country.  In this chapter the author will outline the 
effects of ethnic segregation of the defence forces in Bosnia.  These effects 
include: the disunity within the defence forces, the lack of unity of command 
within the national defence force, the inability to partner with international 
players, the disunity in Bosnian society, weak international standing, the high 
cost involved in maintaining military operations and the lack of transparency 
within the defence forces. 
In the most recent Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina it is stressed 
that the aim of the defence reform process that began in 2003 was to create a 
common defence force.  At the time of writing, full ethnic integration of the Bosnia 
Armed Forces remains a challenge.  Whilst some integration may appear at the 
senior levels and in the defence ministry the bulk of the armed forces remain in 
barracks located within their respective ethnic community, either in the Republika 
Srpska or within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In this chapter the 
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thesis examines the impact that ethnic segregation has had and continues to 
have on the defence forces and the security of the state.  The ethnic segregation 
of the states defence forces is an important element that needs to be addressed 
within Bosnia.  Ethnically divided armed forces can represent a threat to the 
stability of the state and the region if they are not democratically controlled and 
accountable.  Unreformed defence forces also tend to cost considerably more 
than reformed forces to satisfy the requirements of the state and also often 
develop a closed society fearing that reform will result in the loss of jobs, 
privileges and power.  There is also the risk that unreformed elements of the 
defence or security sector may attempt to undermine the efforts of the 
government for reform.347   
Disunity within the Defence Forces 
One of the direct effects of the segregation of Bosnia’s defence Force is the lack 
of unity within the national army.348  Despite attempts to create a common 
defence force, the entity armed forces have remained largely segregated for 
almost 16 years.  The forces have yet to accept the concept of unity, cooperation 
and integration.  This in turn makes it difficult for the defence forces to be 
transformed into a vanguard of national integration as the JNA was in the days of 
the former Yugoslavia.  Subsequently, the disunity within the national military has 
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flowed down to the general population.  The Bosnian people are finding 
themselves shackled to their antagonistic history and ethnic prejudices as the 
polarity in the military implies that their fragile society could very easily slide back 
into ethnic violence.  This does not bode well for the states future prosperity and 
stability. 
Rather than becoming a vehicle that would spearhead national integration within 
its borders, the army is busy leading the country in the opposite direction and it’s 
less than perfect example is infecting other private and public institutions within 
the state.349  Hynes provides another perspective to the dilemma stating that 
continuing to maintain ethnically segregated forces in itself contradicts the 
fundamental goals of the peace and stability process.350 Worse still, the 
composition of the defence forces still reflects the intent of their creation: when 
the Dayton Peace Accords were being crafted, the entity armed forces were 
fighting each other and even long after the cease fire they still view each other as 
adversaries.  In this environment Bosnia cannot effectively reintegrate and 
reduce the risk of another conflict in the future simply because it cannot 
effectively strengthen its state-level institutions such as the armed forces or 
police. 
                                                             
349 Ibid, p104. 
350 Ibid 
 170 
Lack of Unity of Command within the National 
Defence Force 
 
For any military to be efficient it needs to be truly centralized.  It must possess a 
single authority that is in charge of its agenda and objectives.  Effective authority 
is lacking in the national defence force of Bosnia; instead the entity armies 
remain decentralized, with each regarding the national security agenda as 
playing ‘second fiddle’ to those within their region.   Driven by respective ethnic 
ambition or rather the tense relationship between the constituent people in the 
country; the players within the defence sector have found it increasingly difficult 
to maintain an effective single ministry of defence.351  Each entity defence force 
jealously guard their autonomy and continue to resist full integration, fearing that 
becoming accountable to a common defence sector will invariably curtail their 
autonomy.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
351 Ibid, p.102 
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The image below depicts the command and control of the armed forces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, reinforcing the ethnic division of the armed forces.  
 
Figure Four - Command and Control of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina352 
By failing to create a true and effective central office through which all the 
defence activities will be controlled and coordinated, the lack of command and 
control of the armed forces will become a bane to the country’s security.  Hynes 
believes that Bosnia lacks the ability to command the very troops that are 
supposed to safeguard the country in times of instability.353  Theoretically Bosnia 
should be able to call upon the states defence forces for defence purposes in the 
                                                             
352 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Bosnia_English-
2005.pdf (accessed September 1, 2011). 
353 Hynes, p.235 
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event of a threat to state security.  In the current climate within Bosnia, there can 
be no guarantee that the defence forces located in Replica Srpska or the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would respond to that call.  As a state, 
Bosnia is also supposed to call on the entity forces to contribute to peacekeeping 
missions abroad and to meet international obligations in partnership with 
organizations such as NATO, OSCE and/or the United Nations. However, there 
is no guarantee that the entity armies will be willing to cooperate and/or respond 
in a manner that is acceptable to the central state.  
This is occurring because despite the so called unification of the armed forces 
within Bosnia, the entity armies have maintained separate military forces that are 
organized and commanded at the entity level. Hynes believes that these entity 
armies lack sufficient state level command, control and oversight.354  As a 
consequence, each change made by one entity is made conditional on changes 
by other entities, and this has prevented Bosnia from developing its armed forces 
to the standards befitting its security needs. The reforms undertaken in the past 
have failed to address the core issue at stake: that the state is supreme and as a 
fundamental principle of statehood it must be empowered to command and 
control its armed forces so that they can have the capacity to defend their 
territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty.      
 
                                                             
354 Ibid, p.235.  
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Inability to Partner with International Players  
Bosnia is currently torn between two crucial defence reform agendas: 
restructuring its weak security sector and seeking to participate in international 
security missions undertaken by organizations such as NATO and the OSCE. 
NATO alongside other international security players have made it abundantly 
clear that the threshold through which Bosnia will qualify to gain membership to 
these international bodies is their demonstration of reforms in the defence sector.   
Besides apparent unwillingness to contribute to the national security agenda, the 
entity forces as currently constituted were primarily developed to defend their 
territories and therefore they do not refer to the imperatives of Bosnia.355  
Consequently, they lack the capacities to address mission tasks other than 
defending territorial integrity. They therefore must address compatibility and inter-
operability issues with each other and NATO member states before they can 
undertake such operations effectively.  
Hynes looks at this inability to participate in international assignments as 
projecting from the ineptitude of the Bosnian government to exercise command 
and control the armed forces within its territory. 356 This has brought to the fore 
some serious concerns on whether Bosnia is actually on the path to become a 
legitimate and functional state. Hynes suggests that in order for the state to 
assert such control it has to develop strategies that will enable it to obtain military 
                                                             
355 Ibid.  
356 Ibid, The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.p. 235 – 242. 
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authority from the Republika Srpska and to address the parallel, ethnic chain of 
command within the Federation’s civilization and the institutions of the defence 
ministry. Additionally, Bosnia must also address the training, doctrine and force 
structure of its military forces in order for the country to make an effective 
contribution to the PfP.357 This is only achievable through the development of 
robust capacity to organize, train and deploy troops, thereby enhancing stability.   
Disunity in the Larger Bosnia Society  
Undoubtedly, the Bosnian society looks up to the military for the provision of a 
sense of security and unity. But this has not been cultivated given the hard-line 
stance taken by the Bosnian entity forces on matters concerning security. Any 
form of disunity in the Bosnian society invites the possibility of regressing into 
violence. It also negatively impinges on the other sectors of the Bosnian life such 
as the economy. With the reformation of the of security sector gaining currency 
across the globe Chalmer identifies some negative effects of the unreformed 
security sector, which translates into the disruption of economic growth.358  In 
essence, the implicit assumption of the development paradigm is that cultivation 
of social and economic growth automatically translates to peace and stability.  
In the same vein, it is revealed that the three entity armies in the Bosnian 
national military by no means reflect the access to wealth and education; they 
                                                             
357 Ibid, p.206.  
358 Chalmers, M., "Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective," Saferworld Conflict Prevention 
Research Report, (January 2000). 
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are rather a representation of the differences in the political persuasions in 
Bosnia. 359 Unlike the multi-ethnic ARBiH and HVO who once stood for an ideal 
Bosnia-Herzegovina the current national defence force does not. Arguably, the 
departure of the Bosniak military officers from ARBiH and HVO resulted in a 
downward spiral in term of identity. This strained relationship between the entity 
forces has thus incited the general public to adhere to their ethnic prejudices and 
grievances becoming an obstruction towards Bosnia’s peace and stability 
aspirations.   
Diminishing International Standing  
The multiplicity of negative developments within the Bosnian defence force had 
not only denied it a chance to partner with international organisations but has 
also reduced the credibility of the forces internationally. The disorganised 
defence force has created loopholes that make allowances for security threats. 
One such incident is the Orao saga. The saga revealed the darker side of the 
security sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 360 In September 2002 the 
intelligence agencies of the United States discovered that the Army of the 
Republika Srpska was trading in military equipment and services with Iraq. At the 
time this discovery the Bush administration was well into the preparations for the 
2003 invasion of Iraq.  Iraq was also under a UN embargo at the time. The Serb 
political leaders denied the allegations. 
                                                             
359 Ibid, p.105.  
360 Ibid, The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.p. 235 – 242.  
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The Orao scandal brought about a serious reassessment of the status of the 
defence reforms in Bosnia by the international community. 361 This came seven 
years after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace and 
Bosnia still had two entity armies (the Army of the Federation and the Army of the 
RS ), each of them operating under two disparate chains of command.  
The Orao saga changed the entire political landscape for the reformation of the 
defence organization in Bosnia. 362   At that time the international community was 
contemplating an exit strategy from Bosnia but the Orao saga impelled them to 
intervene. With the turn of events there could be no serious discussion about the 
exit strategy for SFOR and the Office of the High Representative as long as the 
two entity armies continued to exist and operate independently of each other and 
independently of the state. Therefore, the Orao saga gave the international 
community the motivation and the political leverage to confront the legal, political 
and military arguments that had been used since 1995 to obstruct progress 
towards any meaningful reform. 
 
 
                                                             
361 Ibid, The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.p. 235 – 242.  
362 Ibid, The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.p. 235 – 242.  
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High Cost of Military Operations  
The structure of the Bosnian defence force makes it difficult to account for its 
budgetary spending.  A country cannot adequately budget for its security 
personnel, equipment and policies if it cannot even account for the numbers of its 
military personnel. This is one of the challenges that confront the leaders of 
Bosnia’s defence force, mainly due to the ethnic divisions that persist. The high 
cost of operations in the defence sector can also be attributed to what Hynes 
calls the inability of the Bosnian state to establish a comprehensive defense 
budget. 363  
Bosnia and Herzegovina is presently committed to streamlining its defence 
forces in such a manner that it will only cater for the operations and upkeep of  
the forces that are necessary for its legitimate defence needs, a concept that 
demands fiscal responsibility.364  This means that state authorities, parliament 
and entity authorities now have responsibility to ensure the effectiveness of the 
armed forces, within affordable resource limits. 
 
 
                                                             
363 Ibid, The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.p. 235 – 242.  
364 Ibid, p. 207.  
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Defence spending by Bosnia and Herzegovina is substantially greater than that 
of European countries of similar size.365 This is not sustainable for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina given its limited economy and pressing domestic needs. Therefore, 
reducing the size of the armed forces and resolving the outstanding personnel 
issues are critical for defence reforms.  The current under-funding in the defence 
budgets has routinely resulted in problems with the execution of the budget. 
Without significant defence reform, Bosnia will remain incapable of developing 
reliable and transparent estimates of defence expenditure, as required by OSCE 
and NATO.  
Undeniably the current defence arrangements, army structure and size have 
brought about many shortfalls in the Bosnian security sector. 366  Some of them 
are the lack of adequate command and control at the state level and the 
ambiguity and inconsistency in law that concern the competency of the state and 
entities for defence matters. The others are insufficient oversight capabilities, 
which include democratic parliamentary control of armed forces and the lack of 
transparency in defence matters at all levels.  
 
 
 
                                                             
365 Ibid, p. 207.  
366 Ibid, p. 208.  
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Lack of Transparency within the Defence Forces 
Tagarev defines the concept of transparency in the security sector as the state of 
affairs where the general public, including institutions such as the media and the 
parliament, hold information needed to maintain the legitimacy of the players in 
the security sector.367  Transparency is of utmost importance to the civilian elite 
who possess the right to control the agents of the security sector, whether or not 
they have at their disposal the necessary information to make sound security 
policy decisions. Transparency is a key feature in a sound democracy and it is 
one of the most important factors that ensure success in the reforms of the 
security sector.  Colston adds that “for countries in transition, as in the case of 
Bosnia, there is a further reason for defence reform; the need to adapt the 
defence sector to the requirements of a democratic state. Defence forces need to 
be organized and controlled by the democratically elected authorities of the state, 
taking account of the role of both government and parliament. Defence issues 
must be openly debated, not only within the military itself but also by the various 
political parties, NGOs and the media. The defence sector must be open, 
transparent, and fully accountable.” 368  
 
                                                             
367 Tagarev, T.,“Elaborating Policy for Transparency of Defense Procurement,” in Transparency in Defense Policy, 
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Transparency involves the sharing of information which impacts the ability of the 
players in the security sector to establish relationships with the various 
government agencies and departments, the media and the society at large.  
Therefore, the communication to and with the wider public is central in the 
effective working culture of the actors in the security sector. It is through 
transparency that the security sector can procure the decisions reached by the 
government on issues of national importance. 369 
Among the South-East Europe countries, Bosnia included, the concept of 
transparency is challenging due to the fact that the societies in these countries 
are divided and the actors in the security sector not easily held to account. In the 
security and defence policies of the defence forces in Bosnia for instance, myths 
and the culture of secrecy prevail. The security and defence policy of a country 
may be considered transparent only if the elected leaders are cognizant of the 
goals of the policy, and the means to achieve the goals including the cost of 
sustaining the means.370    
In summary, the lack of unity of command within the Bosnian defence forces and 
the high cost incurred in the country’s military operations are all the symptoms of 
the absence of transparency in the national defence force. The entity forces are 
subservient to the agendas of their respective territorial sub-government and not 
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the national interest at large: due to this they feel that they are not obligated to 
share intelligence information or to openly cooperate with the other entity forces.  
Conclusion  
Chapter Five has discussed how the ethnic division within the Bosnian defence 
forces impact on the security of the country.  The segregation within the defence 
forces has invariably caused disunity; with each entity army taking the interest of 
their territory as being above those of the nation. This has entrenched negative 
ethnicity throughout the entire Bosnian society, as the people look up to the 
defence forces for protection. The entity defence forces are reluctant to work 
across the ethnic divide; they are distrustful to one another and only loyal to their 
territorial leader. This is a real threat to the potential stability of Bosnia.  
Secondly, it has been established that due to the segregation of defence forces 
in Bosnia, there is a lack of unity of command in the national defence forces. The 
government is unable to create institutions that will oversee defence matters 
across the board as each entity doesn’t support such an initiative. The entity 
forces regard unity of command in the defence force as giving up their territorial 
autonomy. This is dangerous to the security of the country as the interests of an 
entity may as well conflict with those of the nation and cause the parties to slide 
back into violence. This also means that the defence armies are not at the 
disposal of the nation state in the event of an act of aggression against Bosnia or 
if the country is called upon to participate in an international security mission.  
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Thirdly, it has been established that the segregation has degraded the 
international standing of Bosnia and Herzegovina defence forces. The 
governance of the security sector in Bosnia remains weak and is almost entirely 
reliant on the international community. This is why both the EU and NATO have 
placed benchmarks for progress through which the Bosnian defence forces must 
follow in order to receive membership into the organisations. Essentially all the 
effects of segregation discussed above are somewhat closely related. The lack of 
unity of command is a result of the lack of transparency; whereas these two in 
turn contribute to the high cost of operations.  
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Chapter Six – CONCLUSION 
 
The defence reform effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been extremely 
complex and has experienced many more difficulties and challenges than any 
other state, highlighting the importance of ‘Defence’ as a state function.  The 
complex nature of the reform efforts can be attributed to the ethnic cleavages in 
the military, recent memories of a very violent war, an over politicised military 
structure inherited from the communist regime and the constitutional framework 
imposed by the international community and the Dayton Peace Accords.  
 The progress of defence reform in Bosnia is credited to the efforts by the 
international community. After bringing the conflicting parties in Bosnia to the 
negotiating table and drawing up the Dayton Peace Accord ratified in December 
1995, the international community succeeded in stopping the bloodshed in the 
country. This would not be the end of involvement by the international community 
as it became increasingly clear that the attained peace had to be guarded. Thus 
the ongoing presence of international organisations in the country today.  With 
the continued presence of the international organisations within its borders, 
Bosnia remains a long way from recovery from its destructive past. The country’s 
constitution has allowed for the international community to play a leading role in 
nearly all levels of governance and while this is a good check to the ethnic 
tension that may arise if Bosnians are left to fend for themselves, it hardly bodes 
well for the country’s future. The country must assume responsibility for its own 
destiny, in all sectors, including defence.  
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However, despite the efforts of the international community and the progress 
made in the reform of the armed forces toward entry into the European Union 
and NATO alliances, a significant obstacle remains.  There has been little 
reconciliation among the ethnic entities and ethnicity remains central in the 
governance of the defence forces of Bosnia.  This is reflected by the social 
dynamics of the larger Bosnian society where ethnicity plays a leading role in 
determining governance issues.  Confronting the ethnic dilemma in the defence 
forces is not only crucial to achieving unity within the armed forces but also 
bringing about a social revolution to the larger Bosnian society. One such ethnic 
interest, characteristic of each entity army is a reluctance to cooperate with the 
other.  They remain distrustful to one another and loyal only to their territorial 
leader.  This dilemma is not limited to the armed forces; the major political parties 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina also remain formed along ethnic lines and support 
policies that only reflect the interest of their ethnic affiliations and not those of the 
country at large. The threat that this poses to the future stability of Bosnia cannot 
be overstated.  Under these conditions, these political parties have become an 
obstacle to the achievement of the democracy that is much needed to improve 
the pace of reforms within the states defence forces.  While some integration 
may appear at the senior levels in the defence ministry, the majority of the armed 
forces remain in barracks located within their ethnic community.  Total integration 
is required not only to attain full NATO membership but is also the principle 
preventative for the resumption of hostilities.    
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The assertion of this thesis is that in ethnically divided countries such as Bosnia, 
the abolition of ethnically segregated armed forces in favour of one unified force 
is crucial to state viability and the lack of ethnic integration within the armed 
forces today contributes to the ongoing instability within Bosnia. The ethnic 
segregation of Bosnia’s defence forces can be attributed to the separation of the 
entity armed forces that occurred during the implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accords.  The Dayton Peace Accords separated the entire population by creating 
zones of ethnic separation, thereby limiting contact between the warring factions 
and reducing the opportunity for ethnic violence. This separation has had long-
term effects and does little to encourage social integration and reconciliation 
between the ethnic populace in both the military and government.  It has caused 
even deeper ethnic cleavages and the potential for future ethnic conflict. 
Ethnic tension and conflict is often motivated by underlying root causes that 
actually have little to do with ethnicity.  In the case of Bosnia, it was rampant 
corruption and an outdated, Soviet-style, economic system that had begun to 
fail.  Furthermore, it was also spill-over of nationalism from Serbia and then 
Croatia, and the fatal decision of others to secede.   
When the leadership could no longer take care of the people, it stirred up ethnic 
fervour to distract from the fact that the state itself failed in its duties as a state.  
The people themselves lived in Bosnia together for decades without a care for 
who was Muslim and who was a Christian or an Orthodox.  The disintegration of 
Yugoslavia was a top-down state collapse.  It was perpetuated by a political 
leadership that did not recognise the core vulnerabilities of state institutions and 
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the rogue elements operating in the security forces, and politicised something 
that spun out of control very quickly.  Bosnia and the Yugoslav model itself was 
not the cause of the disintegration.  Historically, that region of the world with the 
exception of Kosovo has remained integrated despite racial and ethnic tensions.  
The version of Muslim radicalism that has gripped many other parts of the world 
did not affect the Balkans for various reasons.  Thus, it was easier to cast 
differences aside because language and recent history were so similar.  It was 
only the political manipulation of lingering tensions plus factors such as a slowing 
of economy and rising unemployment that allowed people to really believe that 
they were "different" from each other. 
Bosnia is an interesting case because the formula that Tito used to keep the 
state integrated was the same formula that Milosevic used to tear it apart.  The 
only difference was that Tito presided over a state that was viable because it was 
successful, where as, Milosevic presided over a republic that was failing.  Tito 
knew that the "ethnic card" would see the end of Yugoslavia, so he never played 
it.  Milosevic clearly thought that it would save him from being held accountable 
for his failure as the country crumbled from within.  Essentially, his way of 
‘spinning’ his failure was to blame the minorities. 
 The tri-Presidency announced in 2001 the wish to join NATO and the European 
Union.  This is a major incentive to increase state viability.  Bosnia can enter 
Europe only as a functioning state.  Therefore, before Bosnia can realise its 
aspirations of becoming part of integrated Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions, it 
must work out its internal integration problems.  The defence reform process has 
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had two symbolic meanings.  First, providing security to Bosnian citizens is the 
most important political deliverable to the good of a state; this can be provided 
through a unified army.  Second, NATO leaders are unwilling to speak to 
three different Ministers of Defence, and to cooperate with three different armies 
within the same country.  With immense international effort, the reform of the 
military is moving in the right direction and is set to be the first unified state- level 
institution.  Optimistically then, the Defence Reform process testifies to a gradual 
willingness of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs alike to make the central state more 
viable. 
The author’s experience as a member of the peacekeeping force in both Bosnia 
and Kosovo reveal that in the memories of the people of Bosnia, war is still 
something very fresh.  Ordinary people do not want it to happen again.  On the 
local level, people want to feel safe and not to be subjects of discrimination.  
However, because of the grievances created by the war, there is still 
considerable mistrust between the various ethnic groups and people tend to 
believe that they will be safe only if they are led and protected by members of 
their own ethnic group.   
The thesis concludes that it is time to advance integration and reconciliation 
more rapidly, so that Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian divisions are not so firmly 
entrenched.  While Brigade headquarters are ethnically diverse, the subordinate 
infantry battalions are not.  The challenge for Bosnia’s strategic military leaders 
and defence officials therefore is to achieve diversity at all levels.  Successful 
integration within the defence forces would provide a positive effect on the 
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remainder of Bosnian society.   The key for success or failure lies with political 
and military leadership.   
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